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Psychological research has long established that anger may result in aggressive 
acts, sometimes even fatal ones.  Accordingly, the provocation defense provides 
that murder charges may be mitigated to voluntary manslaughter charges if 
evidence establishes that the defendant acted under the influence of a “sudden heat 
of passion” resulting from “adequate provocation.”  The modern rationale underlying 
provocation doctrine rests on the idea that a defendant’s intense anger had resulted 
in loss of self-control, and therefore, he or she ought to be partially excused. 
Case law demonstrates, however, that defendants sometimes kill out of fear of 
physical violence threatened by the deceased.  For example, persons who have endured 
long-term physical abuse by the deceased may kill their abusers out of fear of 
future violence—even if at the moment of the killing, the deceased was not 
posing an imminent threat to the defendant’s life.  In circumstances where 
defendants are unable to satisfy the requirements of self-defense, provocation 
might be the only viable defense that would mitigate a murder conviction to 
voluntary manslaughter.  Yet, existing provocation doctrine is unfit to capture 
the distinct features characterizing the reaction of fearful defendants.  
Commonly perceived as an anger-centric defense, the defense’s elements mostly 
accommodate the typical responses of defendants who acted quickly, immediately 
following a single and sudden triggering incident, and before any lapse of time 
allowed them to regain control. 
                                               
 *  Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee School of Law.  S.J.D., 
University of Virginia, 2010; LL.M., University of Virginia; LL.M., Hebrew University; L.L.B., 
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1720 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
 
This Article offers three major contributions to challenge existing view of 
provocation:  first, it considers psychological research that found that fear, 
similarly to anger, may also significantly interfere with individuals’ decision 
making processes by disturbing rational judgment, therefore sometimes leading 
to lethal aggression.  Second, drawing on this research, this Article argues that 
provocation doctrine should be reconstructed to also include a fear-based prong.  
Third, recognizing fear-based provocation calls for rejecting the loss of control 
paradigm that currently dominates judges’ and jurors’ perception of the defense.  
In its place, this Article advocates focusing on the fearful defendant’s fear of 
violence threatened by the deceased that caused a significant impairment in the 
defendant’s thought processes, resulting in obscured judgment and reasoning.  
The reconstructed defense would also include an objective component, under which, 
the defendant would have to prove that a person of ordinary disposition would also 
experience such emotion and respond rashly without exercising reason and judgment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Psychological research has long established that anger may result in 
aggressive acts, sometimes even fatal ones.1  Accordingly, the provocation 
defense provides that murder charges may be mitigated to voluntary 
manslaughter charges if evidence establishes that the defendant acted 
under the influence of a “sudden heat of passion” resulting from “adequate 
provocation.”2  While traditionally, the common law recognized only pre-
defined categories as amounting to adequate provocation, most 
jurisdictions today have expanded the scope of their provocation defense, 
leaving the jury to determine whether the defendant acted in response 
to being adequately provoked by the deceased.3  The defendant’s reaction 
is now measured against an objective standard of reasonableness, as the 
defense requires that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation 
would have been similarly provoked.4 
Presumed to be the main emotion to trigger provocation, anger also 
plays a key role in the rationale that undergirds the contemporary 
understanding of the defense—that is the notion of loss of self-control.  
This notion rests on acknowledging that the defendant experienced a 
sudden intense passionate emotion that resulted in undermined 
                                               
 
 1. See Nico H. Frijda et al., Relations Among Emotion, Appraisal and Emotional Action 
Readiness, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 212, 220 (1989) (finding that anger was 
associated with the desire to change the situation and to fight or harm others). 
 2. See infra Part I.A. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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capacity to control aggressive behavior.5  The defendant’s impairment 
in his or her ability to exercise control may warrant mitigated charges.6 
Theorizing provocation as an anger-based defense aligns with the 
responses of defendants who “lost it” or “snapped,” “lashing out” in 
sudden rage.  The paradigmatic example of provocation envisions an 
ordinary male perpetrator who suddenly becomes enraged at his 
unfaithful or departing wife, resulting in his loss of control and in 
killing her before having a chance to regain control.7  The image of 
provocation as male-centric, anger-based defense looms large in the 
public’s imagination, thus shaping juries’ decisions about whether 
defendants’ responses warrant sympathy and compassion.  This perception 
of anger-based provocation plays a critical role not only in the 
theoretical underpinning of the defense, but also in constructing its 
elements; in many jurisdictions, for provocation to be adequate, the 
defendant must have reacted aggressively immediately following a 
sudden triggering event, before any lapse of time allowing the 
opportunity to cool off and regain self-control.8 
While anger-based provocation dominates the way that courts and 
commentators conceive of the defense, anger is not the only intense 
emotion that might lead to fatal aggression.  Defendants may kill out of 
fear engendered by their perception of danger, after the deceased’s behavior 
had led them to believe that they faced a physical threat to their lives.9 
The circumstances underlying fear-based provocation cases vary, 
generally falling under two categories. The first encompasses defendants 
who fell prey to prolonged physical abuse, including not only those 
battered by their intimate partners and children battered by their 
                                               
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  In this Article, I refer to this prevailing perception of provocation as anger-
based provocation. 
 7. See, e.g., Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 719–20 (Md. 1991) (explaining that 
the defendant killed his wife after she verbally taunted him and announced that she 
was going to file for divorce).  While the layperson’s perception of the provoked man 
typically includes a sexually unfaithful wife, most cases where men kill their spouses 
involve victims who merely announced their plan to leave the relationship. See 
generally Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress:  Modern Law Reform and the Provocation 
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1352–53 (1997) (noting that over one-quarter of cases that 
reached the jury where defendants claimed that they acted under extreme emotional 
disturbance involved victims who terminated the relationship). 
 8. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 530 (7th ed. 2016) 
(discussing the four elements of the common law “adequate provocation” defense). 
 9. In this Article, I use the terms “fear-based provocation” and “fearful killers” 
when referring to killings stemming from defendants’ fear of the deceased. 
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parents, but also abused people outside the domestic violence context, 
such as those who were harassed by the deceased.  Take, for example, 
a case where a seventeen-year-old youth shot and killed two brothers 
who had continuously harassed, stalked, and threatened him with a 
shotgun in the year preceding the shootings.10  The second category 
consists of defendants who acted in response to fear of physical harm 
threatened by the deceased in typical male-on-male confrontations.  
For example, some cases involve drug deals gone sour or disputes over 
money, resulting in defendants’ shooting and killing the deceased.11 
In these circumstances, defendants typically claim self-defense, 
arguing that they reasonably feared for their lives.  Yet the underlying 
circumstances often cast doubt on whether these killings satisfy the 
elements of self-defense.  To be acquitted of homicide on self-defense 
grounds, the defendant must not be the initial aggressor and must 
have reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to 
protect against the aggressor’s imminent use of deadly force.12  In 
situations where the deceased was not presenting any imminent risk of 
death or serious bodily injury to the defendant, where use of deadly 
force was unnecessary because a safe retreat was possible, or where the 
defendant knowingly entered threatening circumstances, defendants 
would likely fail to meet the elements of self-defense.13  In circumstances 
falling short of a right to self-defense, defendants’ main grounds for 
mitigating murder charges to manslaughter charges rest on a 
provocation claim.14  Yet relying on the provocation defense raises a 
                                               
 10. Osby v. State, 939 S.W.2d 787, 788–89 (Tex. App. 1997); see infra Part II.A.1.b 
for further discussion of the case. 
 11. See, e.g., Blake v. State, 739 S.E.2d 319, 320–21 (Ga. 2013) (detailing the dispute over a 
marijuana sale that lead to the shooting); State v. Levett, No. C-040537, 2006 WL 1191851, at 
*1–3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 5, 2006) (explaining that the defendant shot the deceased over a 
seventy five dollar debt).  For further discussion of these cases, see infra Part II.B and Part IV.D. 
 12. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 224. 
 13. See Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers:  Some Reflections, 3 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 457, 459–61 (2006) (discussing State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1988) (explaining why an abused defendant will likely fail to meet the 
elements of self-defense in non-confrontational killings involving a sleeping abuser). 
 14. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 530 (describing that, under common law, an 
intentional homicide may be reduced to a charge of voluntary manslaughter if the 
offense was committed “as the result of ‘adequate provocation’”).  In some jurisdictions, 
defendants might claim imperfect self-defense to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter 
if they subjectively believed that use of deadly force was necessary.  For discussion of the 
relationship between fear-based provocation and imperfect self-defense, see infra Part II.C. 
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separate set of obstacles when defendants kill out of fear rather than out 
of anger.15 
Courts and commentators sometimes recognize that the concept of 
“passion” is sufficiently capacious to encompass any violent, intense, 
high wrought, or enthusiastic emotion, which allows them to consider 
a range of emotions, including fear.16  Yet, this is a minority position, 
and anger mostly remains the emotion that is typically claimed in 
provocation cases.17  While other emotions may be considered, they are 
not separately conceptualized as an alternative basis for the provocation 
defense.18  Instead, courts discuss fear extensively when examining the 
elements of self-defense.19 
Fear and its implications, however, remain under-theorized in 
scholarly accounts of the provocation defense.  Despite the fact that 
the provocation defense may sometimes be the only viable grounds for 
mitigating murder to manslaughter, existing law often does not offer 
a doctrinal basis for doing so, especially in situations where defendants 
acted not out of anger, but out of fear, and in circumstances falling 
                                               
 15. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?:  Some Reflections on a Difficult 
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 977 (2002) (challenging the call to abolish the provocation 
defense by observing that “provocation represents the only (or at least, best) partial 
defense to murder available to battered women who killer their abusers in many (perhaps 
most) jurisdictions” and noting that “[t]o abolish the defense is to deny some women 
(battered or otherwise) the ability to claim a provocation defense” (footnote omitted)). 
 16. Id. at 971 (clarifying that mitigation requires an “event that results in the actor 
feeling rage or some similar overwrought emotion”); see also Samuel H. Pillsbury, 
Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143, 161 (observing that “under the 
traditional approach, provocation is effectively restricted to the passions of anger and fear”). 
 17. Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 161 (noting that the inquiry focuses on what a 
reasonable persons views as a provoking event). 
 18. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 328 (1996) (acknowledging and arguing against the generally 
accepted notion that emotions are immaterial to self-defense considerations). 
 19. See, e.g., Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 573 (Ind. 2018) (finding that “terror 
sufficient to establish the fear of death or great bodily harm” was sufficient to prove 
self-defense); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN:  PASSION AND FEAR IN 
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 127 (2003) (stating that the traditional self-defense 
doctrine requires a belief that the person “is in imminent or immediate danger of 
unlawful bodily harm” from the deceased); see also Caroline Forell, Homicide and the 
Unreasonable Man, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 597, 589 n.17 (2004) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE, 
MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN:  PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 
(2003)) (observing that, “[w]hile anger is the most common emotional basis for the 
partial defense of provocation, fear of serious bodily harm or death is the emotion that 
justifies the complete defense of self-defense”). 
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short of self-defense.20  This lacuna is hardly surprising as the law often 
categorizes behaviors into binary classifications, treating them under 
separate doctrines.21  Existing doctrines thus compartmentalize the 
emotions of anger and fear into their respective domains:  while provocation 
is predicated on anger, self-defense rests on fear. 
This apparent theoretical dichotomy between anger and fear also 
carries practical implications.  In many jurisdictions, courts conceive 
of self-defense and provocation as mutually exclusive claims.22  Viewing 
anger as solely triggering provocation, whereas treating fear as solely 
triggering self-defense, courts often refuse to instruct the jury on 
voluntary manslaughter in cases where defendants killed out of fear rather 
than out of anger.23  But even in jurisdictions where such instructions 
are given, juries’ prevalent assumptions concerning the anger-based 
view of provocation undermine the likelihood that they would accept 
the defense’s theory that the defendant was adequately provoked due to 
fear.24  In addition, defendants who raise a fear-based provocation defense 
are likely to face significant hurdles, mostly due to the cooling off and 
suddenness requirements.25  Existing provocation doctrine thus sometimes 
                                               
 20. See Lauri. J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women:  Heat-of-
Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1715 (1986) 
(noting that the provocation doctrine is not necessarily available for battered women 
who are responding to past abuse rather than current imminent harm). 
 21. See, e.g., Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice:  Competence, Feminist Theory and 
Law, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 763, 792 (1993) (asserting that the law provides two 
rationales, “incompetence or lack of capacity” and “coercion or duress,” for explaining 
an individual’s inability to act autonomously). 
 22. See infra Part II.B (discussing the relationship between the two claims and the legal 
dependence theory). 
 23. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing cases where courts refused to recognize 
defendant’s fear as a basis for provocation). 
 24. In Maine, the definition of provocation includes not only anger but also fear.  
See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 203(1) (2003) (“A person is guilty of manslaughter if that 
person: . . . (B) [i]ntentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being . . . 
while under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear brought about by adequate 
provocation.”).  In State v. Hanaman, the defendant claimed that he had stabbed his 
girlfriend after he had noticed her reaching out for a “shiny” object which he believed 
to be a knife, but the court rejected the defendant’s argument for a provocation jury 
instruction because the record failed to show that he acted based on anger or 
“extreme” fear.  See 38 A.3d 1278, 1281–84 (Me. 2012). 
 25. See Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 166–67 (suggesting that current provocation law 
presents significant obstacles for victims of domestic abuse who kill their intimate 
partners following a “cooling off period”).  It should be stressed, however, that this 
problem is not necessarily unique only to provocation claims which are based on fear.  
In jurisdictions that require “sudden” provocation, courts may also deny anger-based 
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proves too narrow, failing to offer a doctrinal basis for mitigation to 
defendants who reacted aggressively out of fear in response to the 
deceased’s threatening violence.  Cases involving defendants who kill due 
to genuine fear of violence, albeit falling short of self-defense, therefore call 
for developing a theoretical basis for recognizing such fear as an alternative 
basis for triggering the provocation defense. 
This Article’s key argument is that provocation doctrine should be 
reconstructed to recognize both anger and fear as qualifying triggers for 
the defense.  Psychological research suggests that fear significantly 
interferes with individuals’ thought processes by disturbing rational 
judgment and diminishing reasoning mechanisms.26  Drawing on this 
line of research, this Article calls for adding a fear prong to the 
provocation defense in order to take into account fear as triggering 
certain killings, in situations where self-defense’s elements cannot be 
established.  The perpetrators’ diminished reasoning and judgment due 
to fear warrant partially excusing them by mitigating their crimes from 
murder to manslaughter.  Such mitigation acknowledges that the criminal 
culpability and moral blameworthiness of defendants who acted out of 
fear is diminished compared to defendants who coldly calculated a killing. 
In order to recognize fear-based provocation as a defense, judges and 
jurors must abandon their current focus on loss of control.  Existing 
perception of anger-based provocation as grounded on a loss of control 
rationale has obscured the fact that the defense’s elements are 
incompatible with some of the common reactions of fearful people, and 
most notably the fact that fear impairs thought processes, obscuring 
defendants’ judgment and reasoning.  Moreover, provocation’s persistent 
requirements of a cooling off period and a sudden triggering incident 
prove especially problematic for fearful killers.  Perpetrators may respond 
violently only after a lapse of time between the event or events that 
triggered the fear and the killing.  Furthermore, fearful killers sometimes 
act in response to the cumulative effect of several provoking incidents, 
rather than a single provocative event.  This Article advocates for a more 
expansive framework for provocation, which not only recognizes fear as 
triggering the defense, but also takes into account the psychological 
                                               
provocation claims based on the theory that there was no evidence showing a sudden 
triggering incident.  See, e.g., State v. Newell, No. 2004CA00027, 2004 WL 2676336, at *3 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (refusing to admit evidence of past incidents where the deceased 
physically abused the defendant on the grounds that the incidents were too distant in time 
from the shooting, and therefore the defendant had plenty of time to cool off). 
 26. See infra Part III.A. 
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findings about how fear affects perpetrators’ actions and incorporates 
them into the defense’s case. 
The premise underlying this Article is that all human lives are of equal 
value, and abusers do not deserve less legal protection than abused 
defendants.  While this Article strongly denounces any form of calculated 
violence, whether it be deliberate vigilantism or revenge killing, it aims to 
identify a doctrinal basis for reducing murder to manslaughter in cases 
where mitigation—as opposed to complete acquittal—might be 
normatively warranted.  In doing so, its goal is to launch a much-needed 
discussion on the interrelationship between the closely related emotions of 
anger and fear by considering the way they operate—sometimes jointly—to 
impair defendants’ reasoning and judgment. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I begins with an overview of 
current provocation law, demonstrating that the anger-based 
perception plays a central role under most formulations of the defense.  
It concludes by sketching the main scholarly attack on provocation, 
which mostly perceives the defense as sexist, misogynist and “anti-
women.”  Responding to this feminist critique of provocation, Part II 
first considers additional stakeholders, other than angry men who 
killed their spouses, who may also rely on the defense.  It identifies 
several categories of fearful killers, whose fear of physical harm by the 
deceased provoked them to kill.  It then examines the relationships 
between self-defense and provocation, explaining why courts often 
view the doctrines as mutually exclusive rather than supplementary 
bases for mitigation and also considers why the doctrine of imperfect 
self-defense often fails to provide grounds for mitigation.27  It further 
elaborates on why these defenses ought to be viewed as non-conflicting 
and complementing one another.  Part III develops the theoretical 
basis for recognizing fear-based provocation by considering 
psychological research on fear and the way it affects individuals’ 
thought processes.  It then demonstrates why existing elements of 
provocation are incompatible with the reactions and mental states of 
fearful killers.  Part IV outlines the elements of fear-based provocation:  
a subjective prong, emphasizing the provoked defendant’s state of 
mind, namely, fear that results in significant impairment in thought 
processes, and an objective prong, which measures a defendant’s 
                                               
 27. Imperfect self-defense doctrine mitigates murder charges to voluntary 
manslaughter in circumstances where defendants subjectively but unreasonably believed 
that the use of deadly force was necessary.  For further discussion of the elements of 
imperfect self-defense, see infra Part II.C. 
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emotional response against that of an ordinary person of average 
disposition and self-restraint.  It addresses potential criticism of 
expansion of provocation to include fear and concludes with a test 
case, demonstrating how the proposed fear-based provocation would 
apply in a case where the defendant’s conduct fell short of self-defense. 
I.    PROVOCATION AS AN ANGER-BASED DEFENSE 
While states treat the provocation defense differently, the vast 
majority of jurisdictions adopted some version of the defense, which 
recognizes that emotions often affect defendants’ criminal behavior.28  
The provocation defense acknowledges the role that intense emotions 
play in triggering aggressive acts by mitigating murder to voluntary 
manslaughter if the defendant was acting under the influence of a sudden 
heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation.29  Commentators 
portray the defense as a concession to “the frailty of human nature,” 
expressing compassion towards defendants who killed while experiencing 
intense passionate emotions as a result of the deceased’s wrongdoing.30 
American jurisdictions today significantly vary in the formulations 
adopted for the provocation defense, making it difficult to draw 
accurate generalizations about the specific requirements necessary to 
prevail on the defense.31  However, broadly speaking, most jurisdictions 
adhere to the core elements of common law provocation—the heat of 
passion defense—whereas only twelve jurisdictions adopted some version of 
the Model Penal Code’s (MPC’s) alternative defense—extreme emotional 
disturbance (EED).32  These defenses are outlined briefly below. 
                                               
 28. See Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial 
Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2011) (noting that 
“some version of the provocation defense is part of the law in almost every U.S. state”). 
 29. See Dressler, supra note 15, at 959 n.5 (stating that “[p]rovocation law is all 
about emotions, most notably anger”). 
 30. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862) (commenting that the law 
recognizes the difference between killing “under the influence of passion or in heat 
of blood . . . rather than of any wickedness of heart”). 
 31. See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1691 (2005) 
(observing that given the divergent views of the provocation defense, there is “no 
canonical definition” of the defense); see also Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion:  
A Defense in Search of Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 432–34 (1982) 
(describing the inconsistent language courts use to describe provocation, as well as 
what constitutes “adequate” provocation). 
 32. See Paul H. Robinson, Murder Mitigation in the Fifty-Two American Jurisdictions:  A 
Case Study in Doctrinal Interrelation Analysis, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 19, 24 (2014) (noting 
that the other forty jurisdictions currently use the modern test for provocation). 
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A.   Provocation’s Heat of Passion 
Under the common law’s traditional provocation doctrine, the 
defendant must have killed the deceased while acting under the 
sudden influence of intense passion brought about by the deceased’s 
adequate provocation.33  The common law adopted a narrow view of 
the defense, under which only predetermined five categories of 
deceased’s wrongdoing amounted to legally adequate provocation, 
including:  “(1) an aggravated assault or battery; (2) mutual combat; 
(3) commission of a serious crime against a close relative of the 
defendant; (4) illegal arrest; and (5) observation of spousal adultery.”34  
The unifying feature to all categories rested on the notion of a male 
defendant’s anger, which was perceived as justified given the violation 
of his honor, as undergirded by prevailing notions of masculinity.35  
Furthermore, the adequacy of the provocation was mostly predicated 
on the deceased’s perpetrating some illegal act against the defendant. 
The deceased’s wrongdoing constituted the triggering incident for the 
defendant’s acting under the influence of a sudden passionate 
emotion.36  Such wrongdoing mostly consisted of some form of physical 
violence against the defendant or a family member, with the defendant’s 
observing his wife’s sexual infidelity being the only exception.37 
Courts gradually abandoned this narrow position after they 
acknowledged that the rigid categories were too constraining.38  In their 
place, courts began leaving the jury to decide what constituted 
adequate provocation and instructing them that the question should 
be measured against the reasonable man standard.39 
                                               
 33. Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325, 332 (noting that at common law, emotion 
sufficient to claim self-defense must stem from adequate provocation). 
 34. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 531 (footnotes omitted). 
 35. JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 46, 49 (1992) (explaining 
that theories point to men not only resenting an affront to their honor but also to retaliate). 
 36. Id. at 51. 
 37. Id. at 48. 
 38. See Dressler, supra note 31, at 431 (acknowledging that a significant number of 
states have adopted the MPC’s approach allowing the test to be more subjective). 
 39. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220–22 (1862) (finding that it is better to “let 
the evidence go to the jury under the proper instructions” because “the question of 
the reasonableness or adequacy of the provocation must depend upon the facts of each 
particular case”).  While many courts adopted an open-ended approach to provocation, 
many jurisdictions continue to exclude “mere words” from the scope of provocation.  See 
LEE, supra note 19, at 31–33.  Additionally, in response to the critique that the 
provocation defense privileges male defendants, the “reasonable man” standard has 
evolved into the gender-neutral term “reasonable person.”  See id. at 26 (noting that 
1730 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
 
Today, courts may reduce a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter 
where the defendant committed an intentional homicide in a sudden 
heat of passion caused by adequate provocation, provided that the defendant 
did not have a reasonable opportunity to cool off and there was a causal link 
between the provocation and the homicide.40  The key elements of the 
defense incorporate both a descriptive and evaluative prong:  a subjective 
inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind to determine if he or she were 
actually in a heat of passion, and an objective inquiry into whether the 
defendant was reasonably provoked to react violently.41  The reasonableness 
inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation 
would have similarly been provoked into a heat of passion by the 
deceased’s behavior and would not have cooled off in the interval of time 
between the provocation and the delivery of the fatal blow.42 
The objective reasonableness inquiry measures the defendant’s 
reaction against that of an ordinary person, with normal temperament 
and capacity for self-control.43  An objective requirement for adequate 
provocation appears to reject a subjective approach; however, such 
objective inquiry is inherently subjectivized to incorporate some of the 
defendant’s personal characteristics, such as physical traits like weight, 
height, and age.44  This position may give a defendant a jury instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter in a variety of circumstances.45  Most jurisdictions, 
however, exclude the defense in cases involving words alone, without the 
                                               
“[t]he modern approach to provocation appears to establish general equality by giving 
men and women equal access to the defense”). 
 40. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 530. 
 41. Berman & Farrell, supra note 28, at 1042. 
 42. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 820 (5th ed. 2010) (defining provocation 
which would have cause a reasonable man to lose his normal self-control). 
 43. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 532. 
 44. Id. at 534. 
 45. While the adequacy of the provocation is typically left to the jury to be 
determined by a reasonableness standard, a scholarly debate emerged on what factors 
may the reasonableness inquiry take into account.  It remains ambiguous what 
precisely juries may consider when they are instructed to evaluate the defendant’s 
reaction to a provocative incident according to the ordinary person “in the actor’s 
situation” and what “the actor’s situation” includes.  See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 
534–35 (noting that “there is a movement . . . to include at least some of the defendant’s 
personal characteristics and life experiences in the ‘ordinary/reasonable person’ 
standard”).  For a collection of some of the different positions on the reasonableness 
requirement in provocation law, see Cynthia Lee, Reasonable Provocation and Self-Defense:  
Recognizing the Distinction Between Act Reasonableness and Emotion Reasonableness, in 
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 426–34 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009). 
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deceased’s additional provocative action, no matter how offensive or 
insulting these words might have been to the specific defendant.46  
In addition, courts and commentators distinguish between two types of 
reasonableness.  “Act reasonableness” refers to assessing the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s act of killing, essentially asking whether a 
hypothetical reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have 
similarly killed, whereas “emotion reasonableness” refers to evaluating 
whether the defendant’s extreme passionate emotion was reasonable 
under the circumstances, essentially asking whether a reasonable 
person would be likely to act rashly after experiencing such intense 
emotion.47  While in some jurisdictions, juries are instructed to assess 
a defendant’s “act reasonableness,” in others, juries are instructed to 
evaluate “emotion reasonableness.”48 
                                               
 46. See, e.g., Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1991) (holding that taunts 
were not sufficient to establish adequate provocation).  Even threatening words 
ordinarily are not regarded in themselves adequate provocation, unless they are 
accompanied by conduct indicating a present intention and ability to cause physical 
harm, they might amount to adequate provocation.  See, e.g., Wood v. State, 81 A.3d 
427, 438 (Md. 2013) (explaining that although the court recognized the provocation, 
it was not adequate to be regarded as adequate provocation). 
 47. See LEE, supra note 19, at 269–70 (demonstrating difference between act 
reasonableness and emotional reasonableness by examining a case where a jury 
rejected a self-defense claim because it found that the defendant’s action was not 
reasonable); see also Terry Maroney, Differentiating Cognitive and Volitional Aspects of 
Emotion in Self-defense and Provocation, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 436–37 (Paul H. 
Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (suggesting that, rather than importing an act 
reasonableness requirement into provocation doctrine, the law should broaden the 
inquiry into emotion-reasonableness by further dividing the concept of emotion-
reasonableness into its cognitive and volitional aspects); Jeremy Horder, Different Ways to 
Manifest Reasonableness, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 440–41 (Paul H. Robinson et al. 
eds., 2009) (arguing that Lee’s view regarding the act/emotion reasonableness does not 
“track the distinction between justification and excuse” and that requiring the jury to 
consider the reasonableness of the act is problematic given the fact now provocation may 
also cover insulting words alone). 
 48. Compare, Dennis v. State, 661 A. 2d 175, 179 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) 
(describing the objective “reasonable man” test, which “requires that the provocation 
shall be such as might naturally induce such a man, in the anger of the moment, to 
commit the deed”), with People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1133, 1136 (Cal. 2013) (rejecting 
the state’s theory that the jury should assess the reasonableness of defendant’s act of killing 
and holding instead that California’s provocation law requires “emotional reasonableness,” 
namely adequate provocation is demonstrated when a reasonable person would have been 
provoked to act rashly if experiencing the extreme passionate emotion). 
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B.   Extreme Emotional Disturbance 
While the scope of the provocation defense has expanded over the 
years, several of its defining elements continue to pose significant 
difficulties for defendants trying to rely on it.  These obstacles are 
primarily the provocation’s cooling off requirement and the requirement 
that the provoking incident be sudden.  Heeding calls to reform 
provocation doctrine, the MPC proposed a much broader version of the 
defense:  the extreme mental and emotional disturbance (EMED). 
EMED provides that a person who would otherwise be guilty of 
murder might be convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter if that 
person killed the deceased while suffering from an “extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation 
or excuse.”49  However, most jurisdictions that amended their statutes 
after the MPC’s defense adopted only the EED prong, thus rejecting 
the mental disturbance prong on the theory that defenses pertaining 
to defendants’ mental abnormalities ought to be separately treated 
under the insanity defense framework.50 
Courts r that satisfying the subjective component of EED requires a 
wholly subjective jury “determination that the . . . defendant did in fact 
act under [EED], [and] that the claimed explanation as to the cause 
of [the] action is not contrived or sham.”51  Courts stress, however, the 
additional objective component of the defense by clarifying that there 
has to be a “reasonable explanation or excuse for [the] emotional 
disturbance,” rather than an excuse or explanation for the killing 
itself.52  Courts further note that even though the reasonableness of 
the explanation or excuse is “determined from the viewpoint of a 
person in the [actor’s] situation under the circumstances as the [actor] 
believed them to be,” the essence of the inquiry remains objective.53 
                                               
 49. See Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (1985). 
 50. See Robinson, supra note 32, at 25 (listing Hawaii, Montana, Nevada and New 
Hampshire as states that use EMED; Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, New 
York, North Dakota, Oregon and Utah as states that use EED; and, DC and the 
remaining 38 states as jurisdictions that use common law provocation). 
 51. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1316 (N.Y. 1980). 
 52. Id. at 1316; see also Smith v. Perez, 722 F. Supp. 2d 356, 369–70 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(explaining the elements of the EED defense, which include a reasonable excuse for the 
defendant’s lack of self-control). 
 53. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d at 1315–16 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(A)(1)(a) 
(McKinney 2006)). 
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EED significantly differs from the provocation defense as it removes 
some of the key limitations that characterize provocation.54  First, it 
eliminates the requirement for adequate provocation, namely, to 
prevail on the EED defense, the defendant does not need to prove that 
he or she was provoked by the deceased’s triggering wrongful act, as 
long as the defendant was acting under an EED for which there was a 
reasonable explanation.55  Put differently, the state of emotional disturbance 
does not hinge on some specific wrongdoing perpetrated by the deceased 
against the defendant.  Moreover, the EED defense rejects provocation’s 
cooling off period requirement, allowing for defendants to claim that 
they acted under EED even if there was a significant time lapse between 
the events that caused the emotional disturbance and the reactive 
aggression.56  Furthermore, EED rejects provocation’s suddenness 
requirement, recognizing the cumulative effect of a series of incidents 
that slowly accumulated, culminating in the homicide.57  Finally, unlike 
common law provocation, words alone, unaccompanied by any action, 
may also lead a defendant to experience emotional disturbance.58 
The remainder of this Article focuses on common law-based 
provocation jurisdictions as opposed to EED defense jurisdictions for 
two reasons.  First, the provocation defense has proven to be resilient 
to change, resulting in the adoption of the EED defense only in a 
minority of jurisdictions.59  Second, in jurisdictions that have adopted 
the EED formulation, the defense is sufficiently expansive to recognize 
a broader spectrum of emotional impairments, including those based 
on fear.  In contrast, in common law-based provocation jurisdictions, 
voluntary manslaughter provisions pose significant challenges to 
defendants who wish to claim that they were provoked to kill out of 
fear rather than out of anger, as Part II elaborates. 
                                               
 54. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 720 (comparing heat of passion to EED). 
 55. Id. at 721 (noting that a specific provocative act is not required to trigger the defense). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Forell, supra note 19, at 604–05 (supporting the elimination of the cooling 
off requirement because extreme emotion may develop over time). 
 58. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 31, at 423–25 n.22 (noting that rage may result 
primarily from “mental peculiarity,” even when there is no physical provocation). 
 59. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 28, at 1039–40 (noting that the common law’s version 
of provocation remains intact even in many jurisdictions that adopted modern criminal codes, 
yet they continued to embrace some formulation of traditional provocation). 
1734 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
 
C.   Provocation’s Critique 
The perception of the enraged man who killed his wife upon 
witnessing her sexual unfaithfulness, continues to dominate the 
widespread image of the provocation defense.  This popular account 
has resulted in extensive criticism launched against the defense.60  The 
provocation defense has been subject to what Professor Dressler calls 
a massive scholarly “attack,”61 igniting numerous debates and filling 
voluminous law review articles.62 
Expanding the scope of provocation to cover a myriad of circumstances 
allegedly triggering loss of control has led scholars to argue that the 
provocation defense is overbroad and vague, as its elements are too 
loosely construed, allowing defendants to raise it in a host of what 
commentators view as inappropriate cases that do not warrant 
mitigation.63  One well-debated critique—collectively referred to by Professor 
Aya Gruber as “the feminist critique”64—is directly relevant to understanding 
why, despite various expansions in some aspects of the provocation defense, 
courts and commentators remain reluctant to enlarge other aspects of the 
                                               
 60. For some examples of scholarly critique of the defense, see, e.g., Donna K. 
Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing:  Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. 
& WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 91–93 (1992) (criticizing the use of the provocation defense by 
batters); HORDER, supra note 35, at 49 (questioning the retribution-based justification 
for crimes committed in response to any “loss to the cuckhold”); Susan D. Rozelle, 
Controlling Passion:  Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 197, 221–22 
(2005) (hypothesizing that “the odds are good that many people have discovered their 
spouses to be committing adultery and yet refrained from killing them”). 
 61. Dressler, supra note 15, at 960–61 (“Heat-of-passion law has been the subject 
of ethical, and most especially, feminist attack.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 7, at 1332, 1394 (discussing modern critiques of 
the provocation defense, including its disadvantages on women); V.F. Nourse, Self-
Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1332 (2001) (arguing that society has 
long since abandoned the gender norms undergirding the provocation defense); 
Rozelle, supra note 60, at 197–98 (criticizing adultery-based provocation as resulting 
from “fundamental misunderstandings” of passion and the nature of the defense); 
Coker, supra note 60, at 91 (1992) (denouncing “classic” heat of passion stories). 
 63. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 19, at 1–6 (describing inappropriate uses of the 
provocation defense, which mainly fall under three categories:  cases involving jealous 
men who killed their sexually unfaithful or departing spouses, cases involving men 
who killed homosexual men for making sexual advances (commonly referred to as 
“gay panic” cases), and cases involving claims of self-defense by white defendants who 
killed black individuals due to racialized fear). 
 64. See Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CAL. L. REV. 273, 276 n.16 (2015) 
(defining the “feminist critique” broadly as “all gender-based objections to the 
provocation defense and not just those lodged by self-described feminists or otherwise 
connected to a specific feminist theory”). 
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defense, refusing to extend it to also recognize defendant’s fear of violence 
as a triggering incident for provocation. 
The “feminist critique,” namely, gender-based objections to the 
provocation defense and its negative impact on women, laments that it is 
a male-centered defense, which is not only deeply gendered but is also 
“anti-women.”65  The defense, the argument continues, rests on sexist and 
gender-biased norms, perpetuating archaic masculinity perceptions, 
which operate to privilege violent men to the disadvantage of abused 
women.66  Those opposing the current construction of the provocation 
defense stress that the defense unjustifiably provides mitigation to 
controlling men who killed their female intimate partners not upon 
catching them cheating, but instead, after learning that they wished to 
end the abusive relationship.67 
Professor Victoria Nourse has launched powerful arguments against 
the expansive scope of the provocation doctrine.68  Based on extensive 
empirical research, Nourse concluded that the doctrine disadvantages 
women because it unjustifiably gives men who killed their departing 
wives in an emotional outburst of jealous rage self-described as a “heat 
of passion response,” a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter.69  By 
recognizing provocation, Nourse continued, the law encourages abused 
women to remain in abusive relationships because their acts of departure 
supply controlling men with a possible basis for the law’s compassion.70 
Furthermore, a critical component of the feminist critique concerns 
provocation law’s emphasis on the loss of control rationale.71  Adherence 
to the loss of control rationale, Nourse argued, obscures normative 
questions about which types of losses of control warrant mitigation and 
which do not.  Nourse proposed limiting the provocation defense by 
recognizing only a “warranted excuse,” namely, that a killing may be 
partially excused only if the defendant’s emotional reaction to the 
deceased’s wrongdoing is warranted, which is measured against the 
wrongfulness of the deceased’s behavior.72  Defendants should only be 
                                               
 65. Id. (pointing out the law’s tendency to disadvantage women). 
 66. Id.  
 67. See Nourse, supra note 62, at 1342–45 (emphasizing that “between forty-five and 
fifty-sex percent of all intimate homicides men commit involve some element of 
separation” (footnotes omitted)). 
 68. See generally id. at 1331–32. 
 69. Id. at 1332–33. 
 70. Id. at 1334. 
 71. Id. at 1333, 1369–70. 
 72. Id. at 1394. 
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able to rely on provocation if they responded to an unlawful act that the 
law independently punishes.73 
Thanks in large part to the feminist critique, many scholars find inherent 
flaws in the provocation doctrine.74  Pitted against the conventional wisdom 
that the provocation defense mostly provides violent angry men an 
unjustifiable basis for reducing murder to manslaughter, a proposal to 
further expand existing provocation doctrine might seem like swimming 
against the current. 
Feminist scholars’ arguments against the defense, however, focus on 
the assumption that it mostly serves to benefit angry men who killed their 
departing spouses in an emotional outburst.75  But the scholarly emphasis 
on the angry male defendant claiming loss of control is single 
dimensional, resulting in general animosity towards the defense and 
in reluctance to consider any further expansion in its scope.76  One of 
the implications of the pervasiveness of the feminist critique is that it 
has obfuscated a holistic evaluation of the doctrine, including its 
potential to provide mitigation to additional classes of defendants in 
other contexts beyond cases of abusive men who have killed their 
abused spouses.  By mostly focusing on the implications of provocation 
on these cases, commentators neglect to consider a host of additional 
circumstances, over and above the domestic violence context, that 
might give rise to the provocation defense.77 
                                               
 73. Id. at 1396 (noting that this view would exclude the defense in cases where 
defendants angrily reacted to ‘defendants’ lawful and blameless acts, such as breaking up, 
because these defendants’ emotions cannot be regarded as normatively warranted). 
 74. See Gruber, supra note 64, at 276–77 (offering arguments to counter this 
scholarly agreement and noting that the critique has proven so powerful that most 
criminal law casebooks now mention it immediately after introducing the defense). 
 75. See id. at 287. 
 76. I am nowhere suggesting that feminist scholars are behind provocation law’s 
failure to also include a fear-based prong as part of the “heat of passion” defense.  Most 
feminist scholars, however, argue that battered women who killed their abusive spouses 
even while they were sleeping or otherwise not presenting an imminent deadly threat, 
ought to be fully acquitted based on self-defense, rather than partially excused based on 
provocation.  Yet, it is unlikely that feminist scholars would object to female defendants 
raising fear-based provocation after killing their abusive spouses.  Rather than implying that 
feminists might object to defendants’ reliance on fear-based provocation, I suggest here 
that the prevalent view that the provocation defense disadvantages women explains the 
general reluctance to advocate further broadening of the defense, in a way that would also 
allow fearful but violent male defendants to assert provocation. 
 77. E.g., Gruber, supra note 64, at 313–14 (observing that the feminist critique of 
provocation does not consider women who kill in the heat of passion and successfully 
assert the defense). 
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The prevalent hostility towards provocation often results in the defense 
proving too narrow for many defendants, precluding mitigation where it 
might be warranted.  The current provocation defense fails to account for 
the narratives of defendants whose fear of the deceased’s violence triggered 
their killings, but in circumstances falling short of self-defense.78  Further, 
critics’ assumptions that provocation is inherently “anti-women” has 
hindered doctrinal developments that would expand the defense to 
include a fear-based prong in a way that might benefit additional classes of 
fearful killers.  These include not only female perpetrators who were 
subjected to continuous intimate partner battering, but also perpetrators 
in typical male-on-male confrontations.  Part II identifies additional 
categories of fearful killers who might benefit from recognizing a more 
expansive interpretation of fear-based provocation. 
II.    PROVOCATION’S ADDITIONAL STAKEHOLDERS 
In order to fully capture provocation’s impact on different groups 
of marginalized defendants, courts and commentators must look 
beyond anger and gender.  In a provocative article, which is not only 
the latest major contribution to the academic discussion of the 
provocation defense but also one of the few exceptions to the scholarly 
attack on the defense, Professor Aya Gruber defends the doctrine by 
offering counterarguments to the main claims that have been 
launched against it.79  Gruber contends that narrowing provocation to 
exclude men who killed their spouses from its scope might also affect 
different classes of defendants, including women.80  While she concedes 
that provocation might be successfully used by violent male killers, she 
recognizes this possible outcome as a cost of having such a defense.81  
She further argues that contrary to prevalent assumptions, empirical 
evidence undermines, rather than supports, the assertion that provocation’s 
primary function is to under-punish men who murder women.82  Moreover, 
                                               
 78. These cases often also fail to establish an imperfect self-defense claim, in those 
jurisdictions that recognize such a partial defense.  For further discussion of imperfect 
self-defense, see Part II.C. 
 79. See Gruber, supra note 64, at 313–14. 
 80. Id. at 332 (asserting that “[t]he defense does not necessarily burden women 
unfairly nor does it particularly privilege sexist men”). 
 81. Id. at 311–12 (addressing the costs and benefits of recognizing a broad 
provocation defense). 
 82. Id. at 307–12 (emphasizing that male-on-female intimate killings comprise only 
ten percent of all homicides and that young men of color or more likely to be harmed 
by a limitation or elimination of provocation). 
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she asserts that such evidence also undermines the assumption that 
provocation necessarily disproportionally burdens women by 
discriminating against them because female defendants are more 
successful at claiming provocation compared to male defendants.83  
Gruber stresses that since women often endure male violence, but 
other times are perpetrators of violence against their abusive spouses, it 
is “futil[e] . . . to make a generalist discrimination case against provocation” 
because sometimes provocation law favors a man, but other times it 
favors a woman.84  Gruber also urges to look beyond the gender-based 
aspects of provocation by acknowledging that it potentially provides a 
basis for mitigation and mercy to marginalized defendants in a regime of 
overly punitive policies and mass incarceration.85 
The key argument that this Article makes in the following sections 
draws on Gruber’s observation that the provocation defense carries 
important value to defendants in varied contexts, over and above the 
paradigmatic scenario of the abusive man killing his spouse.  While 
Gruber’s work focuses on defending existing provocation doctrine 
against critique, it neither proposes further expansions to the doctrine, 
nor does it consider the specific implications of the doctrine for fearful 
killers.  Further, Gruber’s scholarship does not suggest that fear should 
be recognized as an additional and distinct trigger for the provocation 
defense.  This Article aims to pick up the argument where Gruber left 
off, by proposing that courts expand the provocation defense to 
include a fear-based prong to complement the commonly recognized 
element of anger.  It begins with identifying fearful killers as provocation 
defense’s additional stakeholders by considering cases where 
defendants killed others out of fear of physical violence. 
A.   Fearful Killers 
The image of the angry male killer not only pervades legal 
scholarship, with its emphasis on the gendered-based implications of 
the provocation defense, but it also dominates jurors’ perception of 
                                               
 83. Id. at 313–16. 
 84. Id. at 319. 
 85. See id. at 331–32 (emphasizing that “the call for greater penal severity in the 
wake of crimes against women may have a greater connection to mass incarceration 
than provocation critics realize”); see also Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and 
Mercy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 129, 149–55 (2014) (examining multiple reform proposals and 
concluding that “[m]urder apparently marks the dividing line where . . . anxiety over the 
criminal system’s treatment of marginalized defendants gives way to preoccupation with 
marginalized victims’ rights to retribution”). 
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provocation.86  Case law, however, suggests that this prevalent narrative 
is not only partial but also inaccurate, as defendants request a jury 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter in a myriad of circumstances, 
not only in cases involving angry male defendants who kill their 
departing spouses.87  Recognizing a host of circumstances that might 
give rise to the provocation defense, including when female defendants 
kill their abusive intimate partners, offers counterarguments to the 
feminist critique that the defense necessarily harms women and mostly 
benefits violent men.  
One clarification is warranted here.  Accurate empirical evidence 
regarding the actual number of cases involving defendants who killed 
out of fear of violence is lacking.88  Like the vast majority of criminal 
trials, many of these cases resolve in plea agreements; therefore, data 
on cases in which a voluntary manslaughter instruction was sought, and 
particularly on whether it was based on a fear-based claim or an anger-
based claim, is limited.89  The ubiquity of plea bargaining creates a host 
of problems, among them, the absence of abused people’s narratives 
in the criminal justice system.  This problem is particularly exacerbated 
in cases involving defendants’ background circumstances of long-term 
abuse, raising a concern that the widespread practice disadvantages 
battered defendants who kill their abusers.90  Further, in many of these 
cases, there are no juries who will hear testimonies concerning the 
gruesome details of the defendants’ physical abuse.  The result is that 
the legal community and the public are deprived of the opportunity to 
                                               
 86. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 28, at 1037 (explaining that historically, anger 
was the sole emotion underlying the provocation defense, with other emotions 
explicitly rejected).  Anger and rage were perceived as the righteous response of a man 
whose honor, judged by masculine norms, had been wrongly violated by the provoking 
actor, or in other words, “[a] gravely affronted man was justified in responding 
physically and angrily.”  Id. 
 87. See Gruber, supra note 85, at 186 n.299 (providing a collection of cases in which 
defendants sought voluntary manslaughter instructions outside of the domestic 
violence context). 
 88. See Steven J. Sherman & Joseph L. Hoffman, The Psychology and Law of Voluntary 
Manslaughter:  What Can Psychology Research Teach Us About the “Heat of Passion” Defense?, 
20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING & L. 499, 512 (2007) (noting the absence of data 
regarding voluntary manslaughter cases). 
 89. See Gruber, supra note 85, at 175 (noting that precise statistics regarding the 
provocation defense are hard to find). 
 90. See Peter Margulies, Battered Bargaining:  Domestic Violence and Plea Negotiations 
in the Criminal Justice System, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 153, 155 (2001) 
(arguing that “the current plea bargaining system forces survivor-defendants to accept 
inequitable consequences”). 
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fully understand why some abused defendants’ fear of their abusers led 
them to use lethal violence even when there was no imminent threat 
of harm present at the time of the killing. 
The following subsections identify two classes of fearful killers who might 
benefit from recognizing fear-based provocation:  abused defendants who 
kill their abusers, both in and out of the domestic violence context and 
male-on-male confrontational encounters. 
1. Abused people who kill their abusers 
Cases involving abused defendants who kill their abusers, often 
following long-term abuse, do not accurately map into the criminal 
justice system’s categorical rubrics of a culpable defendant and a 
blameless victim.91  These cases are more nuanced than this familiar 
dichotomy; abused killers are not only criminal defendants who have 
killed others but are also themselves victims of the deceased’s physical 
violence.  Similarly, the deceased individuals are not only homicide 
victims, but are also physical abusers who abused the defendants often 
over a prolonged period of time.  This category is further subdivided 
into cases involving domestically abused defendants, namely victims of 
intimate partner battering and children battered by their parents, as 
well as defendants who were subjected to physical abuse by non-intimate 
partners, including victims of stalking, harassment, and bullying. 
a. Intimate partner battering and battered children 
After enduring long-term periods of physical, emotional, and 
psychological abuse, abused people sometimes kill their abusive 
intimate partners.92  Studies have long found that the rate of women 
who kill is lower compared to men,93 but when they do so, they often 
                                               
 91. See Mark A. Drumbl, Victims Who Victimise, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 217, 218 
(2016) (acknowledging that some victims might be “imperfect” and some killers might 
be “tragic,” blurring criminal law’s binary categorization that classifies victims as “pure” 
and killers as “ugly”). 
 92. See generally Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. 
L. REV. 393, 393–94 (1988) (drawing a link between women who suffer domestic abuse 
and women charged with murdering their husbands); Coker, supra note 60, at 73–74 
(highlighting the increasing prevalence of cases involving abused women who murder 
their abusive husbands). 
 93. Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United 
States, Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 27, 34 (2006); see also 
ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 
470 (3d ed. 2013) (noting that today relatively few women actually kill their abusers 
and the number of males killed by their female intimate partners has declined 75% 
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kill abusive male partners in response to repeated physical abuse.94  
While initially, the law focused exclusively on women as victims of 
intimate partner battering, societal perceptions have shifted to 
recognize that even though victims of domestic violence are still 
predominantly women, some men may also be victims of such abuse.95 
Case law demonstrates that victims of domestic violence sometimes 
kill their abusive partners out of fear of future violence, convinced that 
their lives are endangered.96  Defendants who have suffered domestic 
abuse typically raise a self-defense claim when they are prosecuted for 
homicide, arguing that they subjectively believed that the deceased 
threatened them with deadly force.97 
Beginning in the mid–1980s, following Dr. Lenore Walker’s landmark 
psychological research, courts began to allow parties to introduce into 
evidence testimonies of physically abused women regarding their 
subjective perception of the immanency and necessity of using deadly 
force against their abusive partners.98  Walker coined the term “battered 
woman’s syndrome” to explain why many physically abused women do 
not leave their abusive partners despite the continuous cycle of 
battering.99  Walker’s research identified a cluster of features that 
characterize abused women’s responses to battering, including deep 
concern that leaving their partners might result in more battering and 
                                               
from 1976–2005).  This decline is attributed to “access to shelters and other resources, 
increased police intervention, more aggressive prosecutions and the availability of civil 
restraining orders,” which give abuse victims more options than resorting to homicide.  Id. 
 94. See LEE, supra note 19, at 27 (stating that “most women who kill their male 
partners do so after suffering tremendous physical and psychological abuse”). 
 95. See Jamie R. Abrams, The Feminist Case for Acknowledging Women’s Acts of Violence, 
27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 287, 289 (2016) (noting the importance of acknowledging 
males as potential victims of domestic violence); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity 
and Generality:  Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 542–43 (1992) (discussing the lack of scholarship regarding 
domestic violence in lesbian and gay relationships, which occurs at approximately the 
same rates as it does in heterosexual relationships). 
 96. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1996) (describing that the 
defendant’s abusive husband threatened to kill her and shot at her the day before she 
killed him); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9–11 (N.C. 1989) (detailing the defendant’s 
history of abuse at the hands of the victim and her testimony that she believed “he 
would kill [her] if he got a chance”). 
 97. See Forell, supra note 93, at 28–29 (noting that women who kill their abusive 
spouses often raise a provocation defense); see also SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 93, at 473. 
 98. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 368, 371–77 (N.J. 1984) (acknowledging Dr. 
Walker’s research in holding that expert testimony regarding battered woman’s syndrome 
is admissible in court). 
 99. See id. at 371–72 (discussing Dr. Walker’s research regarding the cyclical nature of abuse). 
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becoming trapped by their own fear, which plagues them, leaving them 
prey to a psychological paralysis that hinders their ability to break free or 
seek help.100  Courts have accepted this line of research for the purpose of 
understanding the key role that subjective fear of future abuse plays in 
shaping the typical response of battered women.101 
Much scholarship has been written on battered spouses who killed 
their abusers out of fear, in what they subjectively believed to be a 
defensive strike.102  The vast majority of this scholarship considers the 
legal obstacles facing battered defendants who killed their abusers 
when trying to establish that these defendants acted in self-defense.103  
Self-defense’s restrictive elements pose significant challenges for such 
defendants.  First, the crux of self-defense lies with proving the 
objective reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that the use of lethal 
force was both necessary and imminent.104  This depends on the extent 
to which the objective inquiry is subjectivized to recognize the defendant’s 
own unique personal experiences as a battered spouse.105 
Additionally, the “temporal proximity” between the deceased’s 
threat of violence and the abused defendant’s use of deadly force 
presents a significant hurdle, with courts requiring the threat to be 
imminent or immediate.106  The most difficult cases involve defendants 
who kill their abusers when they were not presenting any imminent threat at 
                                               
 100. Id. at 372.  Other features include “low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the 
home, the family, and the female sex role, tremendous feelings of guilt that their marriages 
are failing, and the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer’s actions.”  Id. 
 101. See id. (describing how battered women can feel trapped by their abusers, 
leading to a subjective fear that their abusers present an imminent threat). 
 102. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 13, at 461, 463; see also Marina Angel, Why Judy 
Norman Acted in Reasonable Self-Defense:  An Abused Woman and a Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 65, 82 (2008) (observing that fear is the primary emotion experienced 
by battered women who killed their sleeping abusers). 
 103. See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING 117 (2000) (explaining that “[i]t is now generally recognized that women 
defendants face substantial hurdles in pleading self-defense” because it is difficult for 
them to satisfy the legal requirements of self-defense claims). 
 104. Id. (examining the elements of self-defense and discussing the difficulties with 
asserting such a defense). 
 105. See id. at 139 (noting that a subjective reasonableness standard contemplates 
reasonableness from the battered woman’s mindset). 
 106. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense:  Myths and Misconceptions in 
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 379, 414 (1991) (highlighting the 
distinction between past abuse and an instant threat). 
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the time of the killing.107  One example includes defendants who kill abusers 
who were sleeping.108  In those non-confrontational killings, or killings done 
during a lull in the violence, establishing self-defense’s elements is especially 
challenging.109  Arguably, in view of their prior abuse, these battered 
individuals have a reason to fear renewed violence in the near future, even in 
circumstances where the threat of deadly force against them was not 
imminent.  Yet, defendants claiming self-defense in these situations typically 
fail because decision makers find that the threat of using deadly force was not 
of an imminent nature.110 
Moreover, the proportionality between the violence threatened and the 
violence used in self-defense raises a specific problem for abused women, 
as a key question becomes whether their smaller stature permits them to 
use a weapon when it would not be appropriate for a man to use one in 
similar circumstances.111  A final obstacle concerns the retreat requirement, 
which some jurisdictions incorporate in their self-defense statutes; while 
there is no requirement that a co-occupant retreat from her home, 
judges and juries may confuse the question of whether the defendant had 
a duty to retreat with the question of why she did not leave the abuser, 
blaming her for putting herself in the way of violence.112 
                                               
 107. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence:  From Battered Women to Iraq, 
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 232 n.101 (2004) (listing cases where defendants killed their 
abusive spouses in self-defense when they were not currently being abused at the time 
of the killing); see also Jane Campbell Moriarty, “While Dangers Gather”:  The Bush 
Preemption Doctrine, Battered Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (2005) (criticizing courts for not allowing self-defense 
claims when abused defendants do not “fit precisely within a traditional self-defense 
posture” because there was no imminent threat at the time of the killing). 
 108. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12–13 (N.C. 1989) (holding that a defendant 
who killed her abusive husband while he was sleeping was not entitled to a self-defense 
jury instruction because she did not introduce evidence to demonstrate that she 
believed deadly force was necessary to protect her from imminent harm). 
 109. See Dressler, supra note 13, at 457–58 (discussing efforts by domestic violence advocates 
to persuade courts to recognize self-defense claims in cases of non-confrontational killings). 
 110. In non-confrontational killing cases, courts are reluctant to admit expert 
evidence on battering and its effects on the abused defendants.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Everett, No. 2046 WDA 2014, 2016 WL 1615523, at *15–17 (Pa. 
Super Ct. Apr. 21, 2016) (declining to admit expert testimony of abuse on the basis of 
battered woman’s syndrome or PTSD); Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 371–
72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that it was not an error to exclude evidence of a 
twenty-two-year history of abuse when the wife killed her drunk and sleeping husband). 
 111. See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558–59 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) 
(recognizing differences in size and strength as relevant to self-defense’s elements). 
 112. See Nourse, supra note 62, at 1236–38 (discussing self-defense’s imminence 
requirement and finding that, in cases involving battered women, courts confuse the 
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Given the difficulties of establishing self-defense’s elements where 
abused people kill their abusive partners out of fear of future violence 
but in non-confrontational circumstances, the provocation defense 
often remains the only doctrinal basis for potentially mitigating 
murder charges to voluntary manslaughter charges.113  Yet, establishing 
the provocation defense presents its own challenges because existing 
provocation’s elements are mostly unfit to capture the typical responses 
of abused people who feared physical violence at the hands of their abusers.  
Defendants who suffered from intimate partner battering are especially likely 
to face significant obstacles in meeting provocation’s elements mostly due to 
the cooling off requirement, which precludes the defense from a defendant 
who had ample opportunity to regain control following the deceased’s last 
act of violence.114  Further, provocation’s requirement that the provoking 
incident be “sudden” also poses difficulties for these abused defendants 
because many jurisdictions do not recognize the cumulative effect of a series 
of triggering events that slowly build up over a prolonged period of time.115 
                                               
proper question of the imminence of the threat with the improper question of why 
the defendant remained in an abusive relationship, thus creating a retreat rule). 
 113. See Caroline Forell, Domestic Homicides:  The Continuing Search for Justice, 25 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 6 (2017) (noting that “[p]eople who kill their batterers are 
particularly deserving of a choice other than acquittal or murder”).  Some jurisdictions 
allow an imperfect self-defense claim, mitigating murder charges to manslaughter if 
the use of deadly force was not objectively necessary or was excessive.  For further 
discussion of imperfect self-defense as an alternative to fear-based provocation, see 
Part II.C.  In addition, in jurisdictions with penal codes influenced by the MPC, the 
defendant may also claim that she killed her abuser under duress as these codes do 
not preclude the defense of duress in murder cases.  See Dressler, supra note 13, at 470 
(suggesting that abused defendants who kill their sleeping abusers may raise duress as 
a defense in non-confrontational killings to bypass the imminence requirement in 
select states influenced by the MPC).  
 114. See Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 166 (suggesting that current provocation law presents 
significant obstacles to victims of domestic violence who kill their intimate partners after 
the abuse has ceased, thereby surpassing the “cooling off” time period). 
 115. See People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Colo. 2003) (citing Coston v. People, 
633 P.2d 470, 473 (Colo. 1981); People v. Lanari, 926 P.2d 116, 121 (Colo. App. 1996)) 
(noting that “cumulative provocation is an insufficient basis for a heat of passion 
instruction”); see also Christine Belew, Comment, Killing One’s Abuser:  Premeditation, 
Pathology, or Provocation?, 59 EMORY L.J. 769, 800–01 (2010) (observing that provocation law 
requires a “sudden” loss of control, thus presenting an obstacle for battered women 
whose fear of their abusers accumulates slowly, resulting in killing but without any 
triggering event that leads to a sudden loss of control).  But see, e.g., State v. Avery, 120 
S.W.3d 196, 205–06 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (stressing that “prior provocation can never be 
the sole cause of sudden passion” but acknowledging that evidence of past abuse “may be 
relevant to show why, when combined with other evidence of events occurring immediately 
before the incident, the precipitating incident was adequate to show sudden passion”).  
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The recent Ohio decision in State v. Goff116 illustrates the 
shortcomings of the use of the provocation defense by a defendant 
who killed her abusive husband out of fear of physical harm but in 
circumstances that fell short of self-defense.117  This case concerns the 
rocky marriage of Megan and William, who first developed a sexual 
relationship when Megan was fifteen-years-old and William was forty-
years-old.118  When Megan was nineteen-years-old they married and had 
two children, but their marital relationship gradually deteriorated.119  
Megan claimed that William was not only emotionally abusive, but that 
he had also threatened to kill both her and their children on multiple 
occasions.120  Once William kicked their son in the stomach, Megan left 
the marital residence with their children, moved to a domestic violence 
shelter, and filed charges against William for domestic abuse.121  In several 
phone conversations, William repeatedly told Megan that he would kill 
her and their children.122  Megan testified that one night, after another 
phone conversation with William in which he again told her that he would 
kill her and their children, she believed he would follow through with his 
threats.123  The next day, motivated by her intent to try to persuade 
William to kill her instead of the children, Megan drove to William’s 
house, armed with two guns.124  Upon entering the house, Megan 
testified that she felt trapped in the house after William blocked the 
exit.125  He then told her that her mother “was going to have a birthday 
present and it was going to be two dead grand kids and a dead 
daughter.”126  In response, Megan fatally shot William.127 
Megan was charged with aggravated murder.128  At her trial, Megan 
testified that she shot William in self-defense and that she suffered 
                                               
 116. No. 11CA20, 2013 WL 139545 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2013). 
 117. Id. at *3. 
 118. Id. at *1. 
 119. Id. at *1–2. 
 120. Id. at *1. 
 121. Id. (noting that as a result of Megan’s complaint, police recovered sixty-three guns 
from the marital residence). 
 122. Id. at *2. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at *3. 
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from battered woman’s syndrome.129  The claim was supported by a 
psychiatrist’s testimony indicating that when she shot William, Megan 
believed that William presented an imminent threat to her and her 
children.130  While the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, it 
refused to instruct them on either imperfect self-defense or on provocation, 
both of which could have resulted in mitigating the murder charge to the 
lesser offense of manslaughter.131  Ultimately, the jury rejected Megan’s self-
defense claim and found her guilty of murder.132 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the jury should have been 
instructed on both imperfect self-defense and provocation.133  The court 
of appeals rejected both claims, affirming the defendant’s murder 
conviction.134  The court quickly dismissed the defendant’s imperfect 
self-defense claim, holding that Ohio law does not recognize this 
defense, and therefore it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to refuse to instruct the jury on a defense that the state’s law does 
not incorporate.135  While the court analyzed in-depth the defendant’s 
claim that the jury should have been instructed on voluntary manslaughter 
on the theory that she was adequately provoked by the deceased’s threats, 
it ultimately held that there was no evidence that she was under the 
influence of “sudden passion” or “sudden fit of rage” when she shot her 
husband.136  Instead, the court noted that the evidence only supported 
                                               
 129. Id. (detailing Megan’s testimony at her second trial after the Ohio Supreme 
Court reversed her first conviction on Fifth Amendment grounds). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  The doctrine of imperfect self-defense allows mitigation of murder charges 
to voluntary manslaughter in cases where defendants subjectively but unreasonably 
believed that use of deadly force was necessary.  See infra note 263 and accompanying 
text.  While several jurisdictions adopted this defense, Ohio’s law does not recognize 
it, as the Goff court explains.  Goff, 2013 WL 139545, at *1.  For further discussion of 
impartial self-defense, see infra Part II.C. 
 132. Id.  Megan was first convicted of murder in a bench trial and the conviction 
was affirmed by the court of appeals.  Id.  However, after the Ohio Supreme Court 
found that her right against self-incrimination was violated, she received a new trial 
and a jury again convicted her of murder.  Id.  The latter trial is the subject of the 
discussion here.  See also State v. Goff, 942 N.E.2d 1075, 1088 (Ohio 2010) (reversing 
Megan’s first conviction and remanding the case for a new trial). 
 133. Goff, 2013 WL 139545, at *3 (listing the issues Megan appealed after her second trial). 
 134. See id. at *8–12 (holding that the trial court did not issue erroneous jury 
instructions and affirming Megan’s conviction). 
 135. See id. at *8 (explaining that, although Ohio does not recognize the doctrine 
of imperfect self-defense, Megan argued the trial judge should have given the jury 
instruction because thirteen other jurisdictions allow for imperfect self-defense). 
 136. Id. at *9–11 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Rhodes, 590 N.E.2d 261, 261 
(Ohio 1992)).  Interestingly, in 1974, the Ohio legislature adopted the MPC’s EED 
2018] FEAR-BASED PROVOCATION 1747 
 
the claim that the defendant feared her husband; yet fear is not a 
sufficient basis for instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter.137  
The court further held that evidence that defendant feared that her 
husband would kill her and their children only supported a self-
defense jury instruction.138  The court clarified that “[w]hile self-
defense requires a showing of fear, voluntary manslaughter requires a 
showing of rage, with emotions of anger, hatred, jealously, and/or 
furious resentment.”139  Furthermore, since the evidence established 
that the defendant acted out of fear, rather than out of anger, the court 
found that the trial court was correct in refusing to instruct the jury on 
voluntary manslaughter.140 
Goff sharpens the normative question of whether the law ought to 
treat abused defendants who were subjected to prolonged abuse by 
their spouses, including continuous threats to kill them and their 
children, as killers who deserve the highest level of criminal culpability 
and moral stigma, namely, murder.  While Ohio law labels Megan a 
“murderer,” she is the epitome of a fearful killer who deserves 
mitigation.  Megan’s deep fear that her abusive husband was going to 
kill her and their children plausibly raises a moral plea to partially 
excusing her lethal reaction.  Such mitigation is warranted not because 
the killing was justified (or even partially justified) but because the law 
ought to recognize that since the judgment mechanisms of fearful 
killers are impaired, they ought to be partially excused.141 
Ohio law, however, provides no doctrinal basis for allowing juries to 
partially excuse defendants like Megan.  To begin with, based on the 
facts leading to the shooting, Megan did not act in self-defense because 
at the moment of the shooting, William was not presenting any 
imminent threat to kill her or their non-present children.  Moreover, 
nothing suggests that William carried a gun at the time when Megan 
arrived at the house, armed with the two guns.142  Conceding that 
                                               
defense, which does not require any triggering incident.  See LEWIS R. KATZ, ET AL., 
BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE CRIMINAL LAW § 95:11 (3d ed. 2017).  However, in 1982, the Ohio 
legislature reversed course by re-adopting the common law’s provocation defense, 
incorporating anew the “sudden fit of rage” notion.  Id. 
 137. Goff, 2013 WL 139545, at *10. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Levett, No. C-
040537, 2006 WL 1191851, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 5, 2006)). 
 140. Goff, 2013 WL 139545, at *10. 
 141. See infra Part III.A. (elaborating on fear’s impact on perpetrators’ judgments). 
 142. See Goff, 2013 WL 139545, at *2 (providing no factual indication that William 
had a weapon when Megan confronted him). 
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Megan’s case does not warrant acquittal based on a self-defense claim, 
the key question becomes:  is the murder conviction warranted, or 
should she be convicted instead of voluntary manslaughter? 
Goff demonstrates the ways in which the law often leaves abused 
defendants who kill their abusive spouses in circumstances where 
complete acquittal based on self-defense is inappropriate without any 
potential defenses for reducing the murder charge to manslaughter.  In 
cases like this, where the abused defendant’s conduct fell short of  
self-defense, and the jurisdiction does not recognize an imperfect self-
defense, the disconcerting, yet inevitable, outcome is a murder conviction.143 
Abused partners are not the only abused people who kill their 
abusers, as adolescent children may also kill an abusive parent after 
enduring continuous physical abuse.144  Child abuse is the primary 
cause of parent killing (parricide), typically involving boys killing their 
fathers.145  After courts acknowledged that nothing supports limiting 
the effects of domestic abuse only to battered intimate partners, the 
term “battered children syndrome” was coined.146  Arguably, the 
rationale for recognizing the plight of the battered child who resorts 
to parricide is even more powerful than that of the battered intimate 
partner; the latter are adults, with easier access to authorities and 
shelters, whereas battered adolescents, whose brains are not fully 
developed, are more vulnerable to the impact of continuous domestic 
                                               
 143. See infra Part IV for a discussion of how recognizing fear-based provocation 
might have offered defendants like Megan a potential defense that could have 
mitigated her murder conviction to manslaughter. 
 144. See Mavis J. Van Sambeek, Parricide as Self-Defense, 7 LAW & INEQ. 87, 91 (1988) 
(noting a correlation between child abuse and parricide); see also PAUL MONES, WHEN 
A CHILD KILLS:  ABUSED CHILDREN WHO KILL THEIR PARENTS 6–7 (1991) (examining the 
case of Lizzie Borden, who was arrested for killing her parents in 1892). 
 145. Van Sambeek, supra note 144, at 104; see also Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 
1012, 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering the appeal of two young men who killed 
their abusive father, as well as their mother who acquiesced to the father’s abuse).  For 
further discussion of Menendez, see Section C below. 
 146. See, e.g., State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), remanded by 
850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993).  In Janes, a seventeen-year-old young man argued that he 
suffered from “battered child syndrome” after he shot and killed his stepfather upon 
his stepfather’s return from work.  822 P.2d at 1239–40.  The Washington Court of Appeals 
accepted his argument, stressing that Washington uses a subjective standard to evaluate the 
reasonableness of a defendant’s response and does not require evidence that actual 
physical violence was threatened at the moment of the killing.  Id. at 1241–42. 
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abuse as they are emotionally and economically dependent on the 
abusive parent and unable to escape the abusive environment.147 
The recent case of Bresha Meadows serves to highlight the gap in 
the law between fear of future violence and adequate provocation in 
cases where self-defense is not viable as a complete defense to 
murder.148  In 2016, fourteen-year-old Bresha Meadows shot and killed 
her father, Jonathan Meadows, while he was sleeping.149  In 2011, Bresha’s 
mother Brandi had left the deceased and filed a police report alleging 
that he subjected her to a pattern of continuous physical abuse.150  
Documentation pertaining to these proceedings showed that Brandi 
told authorities that she was afraid for her life, that the deceased was 
“capable of extreme violence,” and that he had threatened to kill her 
and their three children.151  Brandi further told authorities that the 
deceased physically abused her and terrorized their children, stating 
that, “In the 17 years of our marriage he has cut me, broke my ribs, 
fingers, the blood vessels in my hand, my mouth, blackened my eyes . . . If 
he finds us, I am 100 percent sure he will kill me and the children.”152  
Similar to many people who suffer domestic abuse, Brandi returned to her 
abusive husband, refusing to file additional complaints with the 
police.153  Other family members supported the fact that Bresha had 
witnessed her father physically abuse her mother for years and listened 
to him threatening her mother with harming her and her siblings.154  
Bresha had twice ran away from her abusive father, but she was forced 
                                               
 147. See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile 
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 92 (2009) (discussing the evidence “that adolescent 
brains are not fully developed” (quoting in re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472, 474 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)); see also Janes, 822 P.2d at 1240 
(describing the defendant’s relationship with his stepfather and his history of abuse). 
 148. See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Bresha Meadows, Ohio Teenager Who Fatally Shot Her Father, 
Accepts Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017) (discussing the terms of the plea bargain in this 
case), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/us/bresha-meadows-father-killing.html?_r=0. 
 149. Melissa Jeltsen, Bresha Meadows, Teen Who Killed Allegedly Abusive Dad, Given Second Chance, 
HUFFINGTON POST:  BLACK VOICES, (May 22, 2017, 4:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
entry/bresha-meadows-sentencing-killed-father_us_5922e800e4b094cdba55b95d. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Andrea Simakis, Bresha Meadows’ Cousin Says He Also Was Abused by 
Jonathan Meadows, THE PLAIN DEALER (May 21, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/ 
index.ssf/2017/05/bresha_meadows_cousin_says.html (providing the account of Bresha’s 
cousin, who temporarily lived with the family, witnessed the deceased abuse family 
members, and told the authorities that the deceased has abused him too). 
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to return home after the authorities said that their hands were tied 
without an official complaint from Bresha’s mother.155 
Bresha was initially charged with aggravated murder.156  Given the 
unique circumstances of the case, including the defendant’s tender 
age, the prosecutor agreed to a plea agreement under which Bresha 
pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter, accepting the terms of a 
settlement deal stipulating that she would remain in a juvenile detention 
center where she would get outside psychiatric treatment and eventually 
be released to her family for a two-year supervision period.157 
In this case, mitigating the murder charge through exercising 
prosecutorial discretion was warranted.  Arguably, justice was served 
here, as applying the criminal justice system’s full-blown and heavy-
handed approach seems unjust.  At the conceptual level, however, the 
outcome in Bresha’s case provides neither principled nor transparent 
doctrinal basis for understanding the theoretical grounds for reducing 
the level of the crime and specifically why mitigation was warranted. 
One ramification of the prevalence of plea bargains, where the basis 
for mitigation is not specified, is that homicide law is left in a state of 
doctrinal confusion, as Bresha’s case and Goff’s case fail to neatly fit 
into existing doctrines of either self-defense or provocation.  These 
cases poignantly demonstrate that the law provides no grounds for 
mitigating murder charges to voluntary manslaughter in cases where 
defendants killed out of fear but in circumstances falling short of self-
defense.  Even young Bresha could not have established either a 
perfect or imperfect self-defense claim, had the case not resolved in a 
plea bargain, because she killed her father while he was not presenting 
any imminent threat.  Given the absence of a coherent conceptual 
basis for mitigating Bresha’s murder charge, it is likely that the 
prosecution would not have been so willing to show similar mercy and 
compassion had Bresha been an adult.  Goff’s murder conviction 
indeed confirms this assumption. 
b. Non-intimate physical abuse, harassment, and bullying 
Fear-based provocation’s stakeholders include not only victims of 
domestic violence but also people who kill their non-intimate tormentors 
                                               
 155. See Bromwich, supra note 148. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (noting that Bresha could have her criminal record sealed after three years and 
erased after five). 
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out of fear of physical violence.158  In the typical scenario, defendants 
have been subjected to prolonged emotional and physical abuse by the 
deceased, including continuous physical harassment and bullying.159  
After enduring extensive periods of physical abuse resulting in being 
placed in constant fear of their abusers, defendants might kill their 
abusers out of fear of infliction of future violence.160  Notably, in these 
situations, both the abused defendants and the deceased abusers are 
predominantly men.161 
In cases where immediately prior to the killing, the deceased and the 
defendant engaged in a violent altercation, defendants might be able 
to establish that because of previous abuse, they acted out of pure 
anger.  It is likely that in such cases involving physical confrontations, 
some defendants might receive a jury instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter based on the theory of anger-based provocation.  These cases 
are compatible with the law’s long-standing recognition of the masculine-
based category of mutual combat as sufficient for adequate provocation.162 
In Ketcham v. State,163 the deceased and two others were driving a car 
when they spotted the defendant riding his bicycle.164  The deceased 
began chasing the defendant, first by car, then on foot.165  The 
defendant was able to flee and retrieve a gun, only to locate the 
deceased and kill him.166  The evidence at trial established that the 
                                               
 158. See, e.g., Ketcham v. State, 780 N.E.2d 1171, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
(outlining how the deceased chased after the defendant and assaulted the defendant’s 
friend before the defendant killed him); State v. Timpe, No. CA2015-04-034, 2015 WL 
8151297, at *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2015) (detailing how the defendant stabbed 
his brother during a physical fight in which his brother was choking him); Cook v. 
State, 784 S.E.2d 665, 666–67 (S.C. 2015) (describing how the defendant killed his 
neighbor after the deceased continuously berated him). 
 159. E.g., Ketcham, 780 N.E.2d at 1178 (emphasizing that the evidence showed that 
the defendant personally sought out the deceased in order to stop the deceased from 
harassing and bullying him). 
 160. E.g., Timpe, 2015 WL 8151297, at *1 (commenting that the defendant’s 
presentence investigation found that, on top of the emotional and physical abuse 
inflicted by his brother, the defendant was also bullied at school and had 
developmental and mental health issues). 
 161. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 531 (articulating that “mutual combat” and 
“aggravated assault or battery” were permitted under common law). 
 162. See HORDER, supra note 35, at 52 (discussing how, as the common law developed, 
there were cases between men “in which a certain degree of retaliation upon provocation 
was regarded in law as a . . . right response” and suffered no criminal liability for it). 
 163. 780 N.E.2d 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 164. Id. at 1174–75. 
 165. Id. at 1175. 
 166. Id. 
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deceased had previously bullied the defendant and that “[the defendant] 
was ‘tired of being harassed,’ ‘chas[ed]’ and ‘pick[ed] on.’”167  The 
evidence further established that the defendant deliberately went out 
looking for the deceased because he was sick of the deceased trying to 
beat him up.168  The state charged the defendant with murder, but the 
trial court instructed the jury on murder and voluntary manslaughter, 
which is defined under Indiana law to include intentional killings 
resulting from “sudden heat.”169  The defendant was convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter and on appeal sought a jury instruction on involuntary 
manslaughter, claiming that he only wanted to scare the deceased by 
battering him.170  The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the voluntary 
manslaughter conviction, holding that the evidence did not support the 
conclusion that defendant only intended to injure the deceased.171  While 
the defendant prevailed based on a voluntary manslaughter jury 
instruction, the instruction was hinged on an anger-based, rather than on 
a fear-based view of provocation.172  The court’s language implied that the 
defendant was overwhelmed by anger because he was tired of being 
harassed and bullied by the deceased.173  Notably, the court made no 
reference to the fact that defendant also feared the deceased.174 
Yet, in arguably similar circumstances, where the evidence does not 
clearly establish defendants’ anger-based response, but rather one that 
is triggered mostly by fear, defendants might not receive such jury 
instructions, especially in jurisdictions that define provocation in terms 
of “a sudden fit of rage.”175  Moreover, research suggests that the 
emotions of anger and fear often operate jointly, resulting in impairment 
in defendants’ reasoning and judgment.176  These situations raise a 
concern that similarly situated defendants who kill out of fear might be 
                                               
 167. Id. at 1175 (alterations in original). 
 168. Id. at 1178, 1181. 
 169. Id. (listing the multiple instructions the trial court gave to the jury); IND. CODE 
§ 35-42-1-3(a)(2)(b) (2017) (emphasis added) (defining of voluntary manslaughter). 
 170. Ketcham, 780 N.E.2d at 1178. 
 171. Id. (citing Lynch v. State, 571 N.E.2d 537, 539 (Ind. 1991)). 
 172. Id. at 1175 (citing § 35-42-1-3(a)(2)(b)). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See supra Part II.A.1 for discussion of provocation under Ohio law; see infra Part 
II.A.2 for discussion of Georgia law. 
 176. See infra Part III.A (discussing psychological research suggesting that anger and 
fear are often difficult to distinguish, sometimes jointly triggering provocation); see also 
Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 147–48 n.13 (observing that “having a reason to fear will 
also provide a reason to rage”). 
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treated differently by different courts, with some receiving a jury 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter, while others will not. 
The above concern becomes especially apparent in circumstances where 
defendants’ responses appear to be motivated mostly by fear of serious 
physical harm inflicted by the deceased, rather than by anger.  In some cases, 
where defendants cannot establish self-defense, they often have no defense, 
other than provocation, to allow the jury to consider reducing murder to 
manslaughter.  For example, in Osby v. State,177 a seventeen-year-old 
African American youth killed two unarmed African American men who 
were, at the time of the shooting, being held back by the defendant’s 
friends.178  The defendant confessed to killing both decedents but argued 
that he acted in self-defense.179  He claimed that during the year that 
preceded the shootings, the two men had repeatedly harassed him for 
payment of a gambling debt, including threatening him and members 
of his family with violence, and that on at least one occasion, the two 
men had stalked and threatened him with shotguns.180  The defendant 
argued that he believed that the only way for him to avoid death or serious 
bodily injury at their hands was for him to kill them first.181  To buttress his 
self-defense claim, the defendant wanted to introduce a psychologist’s 
expert testimony concerning the defendant’s fearful state of mind at the 
time he committed the homicides.182  The psychologist would have testified 
that at the time of the shooting, the defendant had some symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), although he could not make a diagnosis 
of PTSD.183  While the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, it 
refused to admit the psychologist’s testimony, and the jury rejected Osby’s 
self-defense claim and convicted him of the two murders.184 
Osby appealed, claiming that the expert testimony should have been 
introduced into evidence and that he acted in self-defense.185  The Texas 
Court of Appeals affirmed the murder convictions, holding that the 
expert testimony was properly excluded186 and that the evidence did 
                                               
 177. 939 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App. 1997). 
 178. Id. at 788–89; Lori Montgomery, ‘Urban Survival’ Rules at Issue in Trial, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 26, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/10/ 
26/urban-survival-rules-at-issue-in-trial/d1a78564-773e-45a9-a406-a5aa3b0a0b9f. 
 179. Osby, 939 S.W.2d at 787–88. 
 180. Id. at 788. 
 181. Id. at 788–89. 
 182. Id. at 789. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 787, 789. 
 185. Id. at 789, 791. 
 186. Id. at 791. 
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not establish self-defense because Texas law requires a reasonable 
person in the defendant’s situation to retreat and the defendant failed 
to do so.187  The court stressed that the deceased were both unarmed 
and restrained by the defendant’s friends at the time of the shooting, 
establishing a path for retreat, which precludes self-defense.188 
2. Male-on-male physically threatening encounters 
Another category of defendants who might seek a voluntary 
manslaughter jury instruction on the theory that their fear of the 
deceased provoked them to kill encompasses male-on-male, physically 
threatening encounters.  These situations may occur in a variety of 
social settings and a host of human interactions such as drunken bar 
arguments.189  Other cases where defendants claim that they killed out 
of fear involve gang fights between two rival groups190 or drug deals 
gone sour.191  In these encounters, perceiving a threat to their physical 
safety, defendants became fearful for their lives and killed in 
circumstances falling short of self-defense.192 
Similarly to defendants who were harassed and bullied by the 
deceased in non-domestic settings, defendants in this category are also 
predominantly men.  Empirical evidence also shows that an overwhelming 
majority of incarcerated killers convicted of murder are young African 
                                               
 187. Id. at 791–93 (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.32(a)(2)(A) (West 2007)).  
Attempts to rely on a theory characterized as “urban survival syndrome,” defined as an 
intense fear or a heightened sense of danger created in urban areas, especially the fear that 
black people have of other black people, have never succeeded in courts.  See Patricia J. 
Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment:  Urban 
Psychosis, Television Intoxication and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731, 740 n.35 (1996). 
 188. Osby, 939 S.W.2d at 792.  The provocation defense was not raised here, as Texas law 
does not recognize provocation as a basis for mitigating murder to manslaughter.  It only 
recognizes anger-based provocations as a mitigating circumstance during the sentencing phase. 
 189. People v. Memory, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 353, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (analyzing a situation 
where a fight broke out in the parking lot of a bar between a group of large, drunk young men 
and the defendants, who were members of an infamous motorcycle club, resulting in the 
defendants killing a member of the drunken group and injuring two others). 
 190. People v. Vargas, No. B252005, 2015 WL 3831469, at *1–3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 
22, 2015) (detailing how the defendant, who was not a member of any gang, was shot 
and killed while fighting with three members of the Mara Salvatrucha gang). 
 191. See, e.g., Blake v. State, 739 S.E.2d 319, 320–21 (Ga. 2013) (describing a 
defendant who shot his drug dealer because he thought that the quantity of drugs was 
insufficient); State v. Levett, No. C-040537, 2006 WL 1191851, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 
May 5, 2006) (involving a defendant who shot his supplier after refusing to pay him). 
 192. See infra Part II.B below for discussion of specific cases that demonstrate the 
problems that the provocation defense raises in male-on-male confrontations. 
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American men.193  Moreover, a significant number of homicides occur 
following threatening male-on-male encounters where defendants 
faced deep fear for their lives.194  Young African Americans are the type 
of defendants who are prone to be treated harshly by the heavy-handed 
criminal justice system, with its disparate effect on racial minorities.195  
While self-defense and provocation defenses are often criticized on the 
grounds that they harm racial minorities,196 expanding the scope of the 
provocation defense to recognize fear-based provocation would 
operate to benefit racial minority defendants.  The ramification of 
enlarging provocation law to allow defendants to claim that fear provoked 
them to kill is that courts would give more jury instructions on voluntary 
manslaughter, therefore decreasing the chances that these defendants, 
including many racial minorities, would be convicted of murder.197 
Arguably, existing provocation defense already covers cases 
involving typical male-on-male threatening confrontation scenarios.198  
Traditional provocation law had always recognized mutual quarrel or 
combat and defendant’s serious assault by the deceased or threat of 
imminent assault by the deceased as behaviors amounting to adequate 
provocation, therefore giving some defendants jury instructions on 
voluntary manslaughter.199  Yet, some male-on-male threatening encounters 
fall short of a sudden physical confrontation that precedes the killing.200  
                                               
 193. See Gruber, supra note 85, at 185 (“[T]he population of homicide defendants 
largely is composed of men of color.”). 
 194. Id. (arguing that any change or limitation on the provocation defense will 
mostly affect men of color who commit non-intimate killings). 
 195. Voluminous scholarship is devoted to the heavy handed criminal justice system 
and its disparate effects on racial minorities.  See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and 
Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1254–56 (2005) (noting 
that policies meant to increase the severity of punishment for violent crimes will 
disproportionally affect black offenders).  Further discussion of these disparate effects 
exceeds the scope of this paper. 
 196. See generally Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense:  Toward a Normative 
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 398–400 (1996) (explaining that 
“racial stereotypes about either the defendant or the deceased can influence the 
reasonableness determination” in self-defense cases). 
 197. But see Gruber, supra note 85, at 185–86 (acknowledging that while reliable 
data is scarce, there is limited evidence that “narrowing provocation would burden 
defendants other than privileged sexists and homophobes”). 
 198. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 531 (acknowledging that common law 
allows for claims of provocation in certain circumstances, including “an aggravated 
assault or battery” and “mutual combat”). 
 199. Id. (listing the early common law categories for adequate provocation). 
 200. See id. at 531–32 (outlining circumstances that do not rise to the level of 
adequate provocation). 
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Defendants may further perceive risks or dangers emanating from 
deceased’s behaviors even before a mutual quarrel ensues or, alternatively, 
after it has already ended.201 
More importantly, anger-based provocation is predicated on the 
notion of defendants who suddenly became enraged and lost 
control.202  In the absence of evidence that a defendant’s killing was 
motivated by anger, instead demonstrating that he or she killed out of 
fear, many courts refuse to instruct juries on voluntary manslaughter.203  
This happens mostly in jurisdictions that perceive provocation and self-
defense as mutually exclusive claims, rather than supplementary 
ones.204  The section below examines cases involving defendants in 
typical male-on-male threatening encounters.  It demonstrates the dilemma 
that these fearful killers face when building their defense on self-defense or 
provocation grounds in jurisdictions that view these defenses as 
conflicting, rather than cumulatively. 
B.   Self-Defense and Provocation as Mutually Exclusive:   
“Catch 22” Dilemma 
Fearful killers are likely to raise both a self-defense claim and a 
provocation claim, making an evaluation of the interrelationship between 
provocation and self-defense appropriate.  Granted, a defendant’s first 
line of defense would rest on self-defense because accepting that claim 
results in complete acquittal, whereas a provocation claim may result in a 
voluntary manslaughter conviction. 
The elements of self-defense include necessity, imminence, 
proportionality, and a requirement that the defendant is not the initial 
aggressor.205  Defendants must prove that they were justified in using 
deadly force against another because they honestly and reasonably 
believed that they were in imminent or immediate danger of deadly force 
from the aggressor and the use of force was necessary to avoid the 
                                               
 201. See id. at 223–25 (discussing when deadly force may be used in self-defense). 
 202. See Dressler, supra note 15, at 971 (explaining that the provocation defense includes a 
triggering event “that results in the actor feeling rage or some similar overwrought emotion”). 
 203. See, e.g., Blake v. State, 739 S.E.2d 319, 321–22 (Ga. 2013) (finding the trial 
court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter when Blake 
testified that he acted in self-defense and “out of fear for his life); see also supra Section 
II.A.1 (discussing abused victims and partners as defendants who kill out of fear, yet 
the jurisdictions do not consider fear as adequate provocation).  
 204. See supra Section 1.A.1–2 for Ohio courts’ view of the defense as mutually exclusive; 
see e.g., Blake, 739 S.E.2d at 321–22 (distinguishing between provocation and self-defense). 
 205. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 223–24, 226. 
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danger.206  In the cases discussed earlier, at least one of these elements 
could not have been established, for example, if the defendant’s fear of 
deadly force was not objectively reasonable, if there was no imminent 
threat of deadly force, or if the defendant could have safely retreated.207 
A failure to meet self-defense’s requirements often leaves 
provocation as the only defense that may reduce murder charges to 
voluntary manslaughter charges.208  Yet, the provocation doctrine is in 
a state of disarray, with neither consistent nor predictable outcomes.209  
While in one jurisdiction provocation would have been recognized, 
mitigating murder to manslaughter, similar facts in another 
jurisdiction would not lead to recognizing the defense, resulting in a 
murder conviction.210  Defendants claiming that they preemptively 
attacked the deceased out of fear rather than out of mere anger, but 
in circumstances falling short of self-defense, are likely to face 
significant obstacles in establishing provocation’s elements.  This 
becomes especially problematic in jurisdictions that view self-defense and 
provocation as mutually exclusive rather than as supplemental claims.211  
The Georgia Supreme Court decision in Blake v. State212 exemplifies 
circumstances where self-defense and provocation were viewed as 
conflicting claims.  In this case, the defendant purchased marijuana 
from the deceased at a bar.213  Upon receiving the drugs, the defendant 
believed that the deceased had “shorted” him and a verbal argument 
ensued.214  After repeatedly claiming that the amount of marijuana the 
deceased gave him was incorrect, the defendant demanded his money 
                                               
 206. See LEE, supra note 19, at 127, 134 (explaining the necessity requirement of self-
defense and the problems with requiring both an honest and reasonable belief of danger). 
 207. See, e.g., Osby v. State, 939 S.W.2d 787, 791–92 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding that 
a reasonable person under the same circumstances would have retreated, so the 
defendant’s use of deadly force was not self-defense). 
 208. Some jurisdictions recognize a claim for imperfect self-defense if the 
defendant subjectively but unreasonably believed that the use of deadly force was 
necessary.  For further discussion of imperfect self-defense claims and the relationship 
between this doctrine and fear-based provocation, see Part II.C. 
 209. See Nourse, supra note 62, at 1341–42 (noting the efforts that attorneys have 
made to clarify terms like “heat of passion” and “emotional distress”). 
 210. Id. (noting that the “reasonable man” standard is applied differently in different 
jurisdictions, some states require a “sudden” passion and others allow emotion to build over 
time, and some jurisdictions reject claims based on “mere words” while others embrace them). 
 211. See supra subsection I.A.1–2 for Ohio courts’ view of the defenses as mutually 
exclusive. 
 212. 739 S.E.2d 319 (Ga. 2013). 
 213. Id. at 320. 
 214. Id. at 320–21. 
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back.215  The deceased refused, telling the defendant to “get [his] pistol” 
if he wanted the money.216  At this point, the defendant pulled out a gun 
and shot the deceased twice, killing him.217  The defendant was charged 
with murder and claimed that he shot the deceased in self-defense 
because he believed the deceased and his friends were armed.218 
After Blake’s self-defense claim was rejected,219 he argued on appeal 
that the jury should have been instructed on voluntary manslaughter.220  
In Georgia, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter if there is slight evidence that he or she kills “solely as the 
result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious 
provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.”221 
Applying Georgia’s provocation law in Blake, the court stressed that 
the defendant testified that he acted out of fear of imminent harm and 
that he was not the aggressor during the incident.222  The court also 
emphasized that the distinguishing characteristic between voluntary 
manslaughter and justifiable homicide is whether the accused was so 
influenced and excited that he reacted passionately rather than simply 
to defend himself.223  Moreover, the court continued, although the 
defendant claimed that he thought the deceased was armed and was 
frightened by the deceased’s friends, the evidence failed to meet the 
standard required for voluntary manslaughter conviction.224 
Based on these factual conclusions, the court held that the trial court 
had not erred when it refused to instruct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter.225  The Georgia Supreme Court declined to recognize 
that a defendant’s fear for his life may support both self-defense and a 
provocation defense.226  The holding stands for the proposition that, 
                                               
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 321 (alterations in original). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 321–22. 
 219. See id. at 321 (holding that there was sufficient evidence in the record that the jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not shoot in self-defense). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2 (2011). 
 222. Blake, 739 S.E.2d at 321–22 (stressing that the defendant testified that at the 
time of the shooting he was not angry or hostile toward the deceased). 
 223. Id. at 322 (citing Bell v. State, 629 S.E.2d 213 (Ga. 2006); Worthern v. State, 
509 S.E.2d 922 (Ga. 1999); Howard v. State, 372 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. 1988)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. (affirming the defendant’s conviction but vacating the defendant’s sentence 
and remanded for resentencing). 
 226. Id. at 321–22.  Georgia courts have repeatedly held that neither fear that 
someone was going to pull a gun nor fighting prior to a homicide are types of 
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in jurisdictions like Georgia, provocation and self-defense are mutually 
exclusive claims, and if a defendant grounds his or her defense on fear 
and thus on a right to exercise self-defense, a jury instruction on 
provocation will not be given. 
Taken together, these decisions sharpen the problems stemming 
from the judicial view of the defenses of provocation and self-defense 
as mutually exclusive.  Under this construction, the same evidence that 
supports a self-defense claim cannot constitute “sudden passion,” a “fit 
of rage,” or “loss of control” as contemplated by an anger-based 
provocation defense.227  As Goff and Blake illustrate, courts often insist 
that while self-defense requires a showing of fear, provocation requires 
a showing of anger, rage, or furious resentment.  They reject the idea 
that the same evidence supporting defendants’ claims that they feared 
for their lives may also support a voluntary manslaughter instruction 
based on the theory that fear triggered the killing.  Under this restrictive 
view, in order to successfully establish provocation, defendants must prove 
that anger motivated the killing or that their fear of the deceased 
transformed into rage.  Evidence of the defendant’s fear, however, in itself 
and without accompanying anger, does not give a defendant a jury 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  This judicial view conceives of 
anger and fear as not only undergirding conflicting defenses, but also as 
completely separate emotions.  By compartmentalizing anger and fear into 
their respective defenses, these courts reject the possibility that fear may 
trigger both self-defense and provocation. 
                                               
provocation demanding a voluntary manslaughter charge.  For a similar analysis and 
conclusion, see, e.g., Brown v. State, 755 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Ga. 2014); Hicks v. State, 695 
S.E.2d 195, 197–98 (Ga. 2010); White v. State, 695 S.E.2d 222, 224 (Ga. 2010); Nichols 
v. State, 563 S.E.2d 121, 122 (Ga. 2002).  Notably, in Francis v. State, the defendant 
killed his wife, claiming that she had subjected him to prolonged physical and verbal 
abuse.  766 S.E.2d 52, 57 (Ga. 2014).  The Georgia Supreme Court held that an instruction 
on voluntary manslaughter was not warranted despite the fact that the deceased had 
committed past acts of violence against the defendant, that she had told defendant the 
previous evening that she was going to kill him, and that she allegedly came at him with a 
knife.  Id.  The court held that “several hours had passed between the wife’s confrontation 
and the shooting.”  Id.  Therefore, while the deceased’s alleged brandishing of knife 
supported a finding that defendant acted “to repel an attack,” it did not support the 
conclusion that he was angered and reacting passionately.  Id.  The court concluded that 
the evidence established that the defendant had shot his wife because “he was scared of 
her, and . . . not angered or impassioned when [the] killing occurred.”  Id. 
 227. See also People v. Pouncey, 471 N.W.2d 346, 350–51 (Mich. 1991) (observing 
that “[the defendant’s] emotional state did not reach such a level that he was unable 
to act deliberately” and that he testified that “he was not angry at all”). 
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The challenges facing defendants who killed out of fear but not in 
self-defense are not unique to jurisdictions that categorically view self-
defense and provocation as mutually exclusive.  Even in jurisdictions 
that do not view these defenses as strictly incompatible claims, fearful 
killers who raise provocation are likely to encounter a host of hurdles.  
The main obstacle is that existing provocation doctrine is predominantly 
theorized as an anger-based defense, suggesting that the defendant 
must respond in a sudden impulse of loss of control without an 
opportunity to cool off, as a typical, angry defendant would.  These 
elements do not fit the typical responses of fearful killers who may 
outwardly appear calm and in control, acting in a calculated manner 
rather than out of a sudden impulse, and often after some time has 
passed between the provoking incident and the killing. 
Furthermore, the 2015 South Carolina decision in Cook v. State228 
demonstrates that only angry killers whose acts externally manifested 
as an “uncontrollable impulse to do violence” may obtain a voluntary 
manslaughter jury instruction.229  In this case, the defendant, who lived 
in the apartment above the deceased, claimed that the deceased had 
constantly insulted him by calling him a “snitch.”230  On the day of the 
killing, the defendant was walking with his girlfriend when he encountered 
the deceased.231  The deceased made a series of threats to the defendant 
and used explicit and profane language aimed at the defendant and his 
girlfriend.232  Later that night, the deceased again accosted the defendant 
and threatened to “shoot him in broad daylight.”233  The defendant claimed 
that the deceased’s hands were in his back pocket, leading him to suspect 
that the deceased was about to pull out a gun and shoot him.234  The 
defendant further claimed that he tried to walk away, but the deceased 
persisted, threatening to kill him.235  The defendant stated that, “[T]he 
dude was coming up and before I knew it, I fired a shot.”236  The defendant 
then fired a second shot, killing the deceased.237 
                                               
 228. 784 S.E.2d 665 (S.C. 2015). 
 229. Id. at 668 (quoting State v. Niles, 772 S.E.2d 877, 880 (S.C. 2015)). 
 230. Id. at 666. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 667. 
 236. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 237. Id. 
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The defendant was indicted for murder and claimed that he acted 
in self-defense.238  Interestingly, in Cook, it was the state who requested 
that the court instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter while the 
defendant was the one objecting to such instruction, arguably, because 
he believed that he could be fully acquitted on self-defense grounds.239  The 
trial court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter. After the jury found 
the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, he appealed.240 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the voluntary manslaughter 
instruction was erroneous because he had acted out of fear rather than 
out of “an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.”241  Surprisingly, the 
court accepted the defendant’s argument, concluding that the 
evidence suggested that Cook either acted in self-defense or with malice, 
but not under heat of passion.242  The court stressed that the evidence did 
not establish that Cook acted in an uncontrollable manner and was 
“incapable of cooling off.”243  Instead, the evidence showed that he 
talked softly to the deceased and calmly attempted to walk away.244  The 
court therefore reversed the defendant’s conviction for voluntary 
manslaughter, resulting in the defendant’s complete acquittal of any 
homicide and preventing a subsequent murder offense from being 
brought in the future.245  The Cook decision stands for the proposition 
that defendants cannot be convicted of voluntary manslaughter if the 
                                               
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 667–68 (quoting State v. Niles, 772 S.E.2d 877, 880 (S.C. 2015)). 
 242. Id. at 668. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 669 (finding that, because of the erroneous jury instruction, “[Cook] will 
not have to face a jury of his peers on the charge of murder again” (alterations in 
original) (quoting State v. Cooley, 536 S.E.2d 666, 670 (S.C. 2000)).  Under South 
Carolina law, to prove voluntary manslaughter, the state bears the burden of 
demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully killed 
another in sudden heat of passion based on sufficient legal provocation.  See 
ANDERSON, S.C. REQUESTS TO CHARGE - CRIMINAL, § 2–7 (2d ed. 2012).  Conversely, in 
other jurisdictions, such as California, Florida, and Maine, defendants bear the burden 
of establishing that they acted under sudden heat of passion to reduce their murder 
charge to voluntary manslaughter.  See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 684–85 
(1975) (questioning the constitutionality of a Maine statute requiring the defendant 
to bear the burden of proof); People v. Rios, 2 P.3d 1066, 1074 (Cal. 2000) 
(maintaining that the defendant has the obligation of showing evidence to raise doubt 
of his guilt of murder); Villella v. State, 833 So. 2d 192, 195–96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (noting the importance of defendant providing evidence to support that 
defendant acted in the heat of passion). 
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evidence establishes that they killed the deceased out of fear of death 
but in a manner suggesting that they were acting under control rather 
than loss of control and irresistible impulse.246 
Judicial refusal to recognize provocation and self-defense as 
cumulative rather than conflicting claims stems from an assumption 
that different response mechanisms underlie these distinct doctrines; 
self-defense assumes a cognitive-based decision, namely, a choice 
followed by a carefully calculated risk-assessment under which the use 
of deadly force was imminently necessary for defensive purposes.  This 
view further assumes that the choice was a cold, deliberate, and 
reasoned decision.  In contrast, provocation assumes the opposite 
response, namely an emotional reaction triggered by anger resulting 
in loss of control.  Self-defense and provocation doctrines are therefore 
predicated on contrasting understandings of defendants’ behaviors 
because an inability to exercise restraint is incompatible with a 
deliberated and reasoned decision to kill in self-defense.  The thought 
processes and response mechanisms of fearful killers are simply 
inconsistent with those of angry defendants. 
Given the conceptual understanding of self-defense and provocation as 
irreconcilable claims, defendants and their defense attorneys might find 
themselves in an untenable “‘Catch 22’ dilemma.”247  In jurisdictions that 
view provocation and self-defense as conflicting, rather than cumulative 
defenses, defendants are forced to make a strategic choice between 
claiming that they killed out of fear and claiming that they killed out 
of anger, as grounding their case on self-defense precludes them from 
relying on provocation.  While the advantage of a successful self-defense 
claim is obvious since it results in complete acquittal,248 solely relying on it is 
risky because of the far-reaching implications of a murder conviction if the 
jury is not persuaded that use of deadly force was necessary or imminent. 
Alternatively, to avoid the risk of the jury rejecting a self-defense 
claim, defendants may choose to plead guilty to voluntary 
manslaughter.  The problem with that strategy is that defendants 
                                               
 246. See, e.g., State v. Oates, 803 S.E.2d 911, 923–24 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017) (holding 
that a defendant’s fear may warrant a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction only if 
the evidence shows that the fear “manifest[ed] itself in an uncontrollable impulse to do 
violence,” but not if the defendant’s fear was manifested “in a deliberate, controlled 
manner” (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Starnes, 668 S.E.2d 604, 609 (S.C. 2010)). 
 247. English Law Comm’n, Report No. 290, Partial Defences to Murder 51 (2004), 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc290_Partial_Defences_to_Murder.pdf. 
 248. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 207, 223 (explaining that justifications result in 
acquittal and stating that self-defense is a justification). 
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forego the possibility of complete acquittal and will be convicted of 
voluntary manslaughter, even if the circumstances underlying their 
case arguably could have established the elements of self-defense.  This 
problem is especially disconcerting given the fact that the vast majority 
of criminal cases resolve in guilty pleas.249  The concern here is that 
some defendants may initially choose to plead out to voluntary 
manslaughter charges, waiving the opportunity to be acquitted on self-
defense grounds.  The second issue with attempting to rely on 
provocation in cases where defendants choose to go to trial rather than 
plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter is that fearful killers might face 
judicial reluctance to recognize fear as triggering provocation in 
jurisdictions that insist that only anger triggers the defense.250 
Courts’ reluctance to recognize that defendants’ fear may give rise 
to both self-defense as well as to the provocation defense has not been 
subject to scholarly critique.  A review of the literature reveals that 
commentators have yet to suggest that provocation law ought to 
recognize fear as an additional basis for triggering provocation.  
Commentators’ treatment of self-defense and provocation shows that 
the prevalent scholarly view is that fear is the emotion underlying self-
defense while anger sustains provocation.251  For example, Professor 
Cynthia Lee’s book Murder and the Reasonable Man:  Passion and Fear in 
the Criminal Courtroom provides an in-depth examination of the notion 
of reasonableness with respect to both provocation and self-defense 
doctrines.252  In two separate parts, Lee first examines “crimes of 
passion” under provocation defense, then considers “crimes of fear” 
under the doctrine of self-defense.253  The completely isolated 
treatment of the emotions of anger and fear as respectively rooting the 
defenses of provocation and self-defense reinforces the familiar idea 
that provocation is an anger-based defense whereas self-defense is fear-
based.  This view implies that fear alone does not trigger provocation.  
Professor Reid Fontaine further sharpens the distinct operation of anger 
and fear under two separate doctrines by observing that “reactive violence 
is exemplified by a ‘heated’ emotional retaliation . . . in response to a 
situation that is perceived to be wrongful or threatening . . . [and] is 
                                               
 249. Id. at 230 (elaborating on general circumstances for accepting pleas). 
 250. Id. at 539 (questioning whether any “adequately provoked” killers are more justified 
in their killings, but recognizing that anger or other passion as the catalyst for these killings). 
 251. See LEE, supra note 19, at 7, 10. 
 252. Id. at 25, 131–32. 
 253. See id. at 15–124 (discussing anger); id. at 125–200 (discussing fear). 
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normally engaged out of anger toward a perceived provoker (e.g., heat of 
passion) or fear of a perceived threat (e.g., self-defense).”254 
The dichotomy between anger and fear, which the scholarly view of 
provocation and self-defense reinforces, is hardly surprising as 
criminal law often breaks down behaviors into binary categories, such 
as guilty/not-guilty and blameworthy/non-blameworthy.255  Here, the 
law perceives fear as conceptually fitting within self-defense doctrine 
and anger as suitable for the provocation doctrine.  Such a binary 
dichotomy refuses to recognize that behavior that is triggered by deep 
fear exists on a continuum and that the same conduct that may give 
rise to self-defense may also establish fear-based provocation.  The 
unwillingness to consider the implications of fear on the provocation 
doctrine results in refraining from further delving into the 
interrelationship between these two emotions, resulting in fear-based 
provocation remaining under-theorized. 
One way to resolve defendants’ dilemma of having to choose 
between claiming self-defense or provocation is the solution that this 
Article proposes below.256  But before moving forward, the following 
subsection takes a brief detour to consider imperfect self-defense 
claims and particularly the scope and limitations of these claims.  It 
explains why recognizing fear-based provocation offers a preferable 
legal doctrine in cases involving fearful killers who killed in 
circumstances falling short of perfect self-defense even in jurisdictions 
that also recognize imperfect self-defense. 
C.   Imperfect Self-Defense and Defendants Who Killed out of Fear 
Traditionally, self-defense has been conceptualized as an “all or 
nothing” defense, meaning that the defendant was either justified in 
using deadly force and acquitted of any crime or unjustified and 
convicted of murder.257  Many jurisdictions today still adhere to this 
                                               
 254. See Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as 
Excuse Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 31 (2009). 
 255. See Drumbl, supra note 91, at 218–19 (observing that criminal law envisions 
“finality, disjuncture and categor[ies],” viewing victims as “pure and ideal” and killers 
as “unadulterated and ugly”). 
 256. See infra Part IV. 
 257. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 234 (noting that the common law rule 
did not recognize imperfect self-defense claims in cases of defendants’ unreasonable 
beliefs about the necessity of using deadly force). 
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position, recognizing only perfect self-defense.258  Influenced by the 
MPC, a growing number of jurisdictions now recognize imperfect self-
defense in cases where defendants subjectively but unreasonably believed 
that the use of deadly force was necessary, resulting in a voluntary 
manslaughter conviction rather than in complete acquittal.259 
Arguably, the fearful killers described in the previous sections could 
raise an imperfect self-defense claim if they killed in circumstances 
falling short of a perfect self-defense.  Professor Caroline Forell, for 
example, argues that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense already 
addresses circumstances where reducing murder charges to 
manslaughter charges might be warranted when fearful killers react 
unreasonably and are unable to establish a perfect self-defense.260  
Forell’s view further reinforces the chasm between anger and fear by 
proposing to explicitly exclude defendants’ fear from the scope of the 
provocation defense, specifically limiting the operation of the defense 
only to anger-triggered homicides.261 
A number of reasons support the conclusion that recognizing  
fear-based provocation provides not only a preferable defense compared to 
imperfect self-defense, but also an additional doctrinal basis for mitigating 
murder to voluntary manslaughter.  To begin with, a significant number of 
                                               
 258. A significant number of jurisdictions, including those following the MPC, 
refuse to recognize the doctrine of imperfect self-defense.  See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 9.32 (West 2007) (providing the elements of self-defense, while not including 
an imperfect self-defense claim); Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1056 n.3 (Fla. 2012); 
People v. Reese, 815 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Mich. 2012); State v. Williams, 774 A.2d 457, 463 (N.J. 
2001); State v. Goff, No. 11CA20, 2013 WL 139545, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2013); State 
v. Garcia, 883 A.2d 1131, 1139 (R.I. 2005); State v. Sams, 764 S.E.2d 511, 517 (S.C. 2014); 
State v. Shaw, 721 A.2d 486, 488 (Vt. 1998). 
 259. See, e.g., People v. Blacksher, 259 P.3d 370, 421 (Cal. 2011) (finding that jury 
instructions for voluntary manslaughter may be given when the killing was committed 
under the unreasonable but good faith belief in the need to act in self-defense, since 
the killing is considered to be done without malice).  Maryland also recognizes perfect 
and imperfect self-defense. See State v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 439 (Md. 2004).  Some 
jurisdictions allow an imperfect self-defense claim in cases where defendants were non-
deadly aggressors who used deadly force when they could have retreated.  See State v. 
Vigilante, 608 A.2d 425, 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). 
 260. See Forell, supra note 19, at 439 (suggesting that imperfect self-defense is more 
appropriate and should be used when the killing was unreasonable but the defendant 
reasonably feared imminent bodily injury or death); see also Forell, supra note 93, at 
69–70 (expressing preference for changes in self-defense laws rather than in provocation 
laws to address the problem of battered women who killed their domestic partners out of 
fear of violence, who should often be acquitted or not charged of any homicide). 
 261. See Forell, supra note 19, at 438–39. 
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jurisdictions do not recognize the doctrine of imperfect self-defense.262  In 
these jurisdictions, the provocation defense remains the only viable 
defense that might reduce murder charges to manslaughter.263  Excluding 
fear from the scope of the provocation defense leaves defendants in these 
jurisdictions with one of two possibilities:  either prevailing on perfect self-
defense grounds or being convicted of murder.  Limiting the scope of the 
provocation defense strictly to anger-based claims deprives defendants 
whose behavior warrants mitigation, including those who suffered 
domestic abuse, any doctrinal basis that might have allowed reducing 
their murder charges to manslaughter.264 
But even in jurisdictions that recognize imperfect self-defense, fear-
based provocation remains critically important because it adds another 
basis for mitigation, reaching circumstances that imperfect self-
defense would not cover.  An imperfect self-defense claim is predicated 
on the theory that the defendant subjectively but unreasonably 
believed that use of deadly force was immediately necessary to defend 
against imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.265  Imperfect 
self-defense thus assumes that mitigating murder to manslaughter is 
warranted because the defendant overreacted to a perceived threat, 
even if it was an objectively unreasonable and excessive reaction.266  In 
many situations, however, defendants are not entitled to either self-
defense or imperfect self-defense for reasons unrelated to the 
reasonableness of their beliefs, but mostly given their inability to 
establish the critically important imminent threat element.267 
The doctrine of imperfect self-defense is unable to mitigate murder 
to manslaughter in cases where there was no imminent threat of using 
                                               
 262. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change:  Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide 
Law Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 33, 101 (2010); see also supra note 258 (listing 
examples of jurisdictions that do not recognize imperfect self-defense doctrine). 
 263. See Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 147 (observing that in states that do not 
recognize imperfect self-defense, the provocation doctrine may be the only doctrinal 
basis for mitigating murder to manslaughter). 
 264. See Cynthia Lee, Response to Professor Forell, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 
445–46 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (arguing that a victim of domestic abuse 
would likely not receive a jury instruction on self-defense in a jurisdiction that did not 
recognize a fear provocation). 
 265. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 235. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12–13 (N.C. 1989) (stressing that the 
defendant, who had killed her sleeping husband, could not request a jury instruction 
based on either perfect or imperfect self-defense because the evidence did not 
demonstrate that she had reacted to an imminent threat of bodily harm or death). 
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deadly force by the deceased.  Importantly, the imminent nature of the 
threat remains a critical requirement under both perfect and 
imperfect self-defense claims.268  An imperfect self-defense claim is 
predicated on a defendant’s actual belief that the deceased threatened 
immediate bodily harm, implying a calculated risk assessment that is 
grounded in a cognitive-based decision, that there is an imminent need 
to use deadly force.269  Notably, defendants are unable to prove that 
the threat to use deadly force against them was imminent in 
circumstances involving non-confrontational killings, either because 
the deceased were sleeping at the time of the killing or otherwise not 
presenting any imminent threat.270  For example, in Goff, even assuming 
that Ohio did recognize imperfect self-defense, nothing in the 
evidence suggested that the deceased presented an imminent threat to 
kill the defendant and/or the children who were not present at the 
time of the killing.271  Thus, if defendants are unable to establish that 
the threat to use deadly force against them was of an imminent nature, 
the elements of imperfect self-defense will not be met. 
Additionally, provocation and imperfect self-defense are doctrinally 
distinct defenses, requiring proof of completely different elements.272  
For example, imperfect self-defense requires, among other elements, 
imminent threat to use deadly force,273 while provocation requires 
intense passion that distorted defendant’s judgment.274  In fact, to 
reduce murder charges to manslaughter based on provocation, the 
defendant is not required to prove that there was an imminent need 
to use deadly force.275  Instead, the defendant must prove that the 
                                               
 268. See Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that 
the defendant must show that he actually believed that the peril was imminent). 
 269. See id. at 1030 (emphasizing that the provocation defense is not available if there is 
a sufficient gap of time, a “cooling off period,” between the provocation and the act). 
 270. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 536 (lack of imminence in non-confrontational killings). 
 271. No. 11CA20, 2013 WL 139545, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2013) (holding that 
Ohio law does not recognize the imperfect self-defense doctrine).  For further discussion 
of Goff, see supra Part II.A.1.a. 
 272. See Ramsey, supra note 262, at 100 (noting that heat of passion and imperfect 
self-defense are two distinct doctrines). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 36 n.7 (explaining that some MPC states mitigate murder to manslaughter 
when the defendant claimed to have reacted to an extreme emotional disturbance). 
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deceased’s behavior triggered an emotional outburst that interfered 
with defendant’s rational thinking.276 
The infamous trial of Lyle and Erik Menendez, who were charged 
and convicted of killing their parents, provides an example where a 
California court refused to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense due 
to lack of evidence that the deceased posed an imminent peril of deadly 
force to the defendants.277  In this case, the prosecution argued that the 
defendants killed their parents in order to obtain an early inheritance.278  
The defense’s theory, however, was that the defendants killed out of fear 
that their parents were going to kill them, following long years of 
continuous physical and sexual abuse of the defendants.279  Erik Menendez 
testified that, five days before the killings, he told his brother, Lyle, 
about the years of sexual abuse he had suffered by their father.280  Lyle 
confronted their father, Jose, who subsequently yelled at Erik for 
disclosing the abuse to his brother.281  At trial, Erik claimed that this 
argument, together with the years of abuse and threats, made him believe 
that his parents would kill him and his brother.282 
The defendants’ main line of defense rested on an imperfect self-
defense doctrine, but the trial court refused to instruct the jury on this 
theory.283  The California Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
refusal to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense, upholding the 
murder convictions.284  The court of appeals held that the defense did 
not present sufficient evidence that at the moment of the killing, the 
defendants had an actual fear and the need to defend against imminent 
peril to life or great bodily injury.285  The court noted that in the time 
between the confrontation with their father and the killings, the 
defendants retrieved shotguns from a car, reloaded them with better 
ammunition, and returned to the house before opening fire on their 
unarmed parents.286  The court further stressed that Erik understood 
                                               
 276. See Fontaine, supra note 254, at 29–30 (recognizing that adequate provocation 
entails “provocation by the victim that would be sufficient to significantly undermine 
the rationality of a reasonable person”). 
 277. Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 278. Id. at 1017. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 1023–24, 1028. 
 284. Id. at 1028–29. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1028. 
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that there was no imminent peril, but rather the threat of future harm, 
and held that self-defense cannot be based on such prospective fear.287  
The fear that their parents had the capacity to and might, at some 
point, harm the defendants, continued the court, was insufficient to 
entitle them to imperfect self-defense jury instruction.288 
While the provocation defense was not raised at the Menendez trial, 
it is plausible to surmise that had the Menendez defense relied on the 
theory of fear-based provocation, the jury might have been persuaded 
to return a voluntary manslaughter verdict.  Unlike imperfect self-
defense, the defense of fear-based provocation does not require proof 
that the defendant faced an immediate threat of physical harm.289  
Instead, it requires evidence that the defendant’s thought process, 
reasoning, and judgment were significantly impaired as a result of fear 
of the deceased’s inflicting physical harm.290 
Moreover, to establish imperfect self-defense, defendants still have 
to prove that they subjectively believed that the deceased threatened 
them with use of deadly force, as opposed to non-deadly force.291  
Provoked killers do not need to prove that they believed deadly force 
was about to be used against them.292  There might be circumstances 
where defendants persuade the jury that their judgment was impaired 
as a result of fear even if they fail to make the case that they feared use 
of deadly force against them, for example, if there was no evidence that 
the deceased possessed a weapon. 
Given the conceptually distinct bases for the two defenses, a jury 
might reject the theory of imperfect self-defense, yet still plausibly 
accept the theory of provocation, as dismissing one of these theories 
does not necessarily result in dismissing the other.293  Since the two 
defenses require proof of different elements, there might be cases in 
                                               
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 1030. 
 289. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 262, at 100. 
 290. See infra Part IV. 
 291. See Ramsey, supra note 262, at 100 (noting that self-defense claims can be raised 
only by defendants who “believed that deadly force was necessary for self-protection . . . in 
the face of mortal danger”). 
 292. See id. (explaining that fear, which can provide the basis for a provocation 
defense, can be induced by non-mortal threats). 
 293. Id. at 100–01; see also People v. Thomas, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 480 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2013) (noting that even when facts “fit more precisely with a homicide mitigated 
by imperfect self-defense . . . they may also show that [the defendant] was guilty only 
of voluntary manslaughter because when he shot [the victim] his passion was aroused 
and his reason was obscured due to a sudden quarrel”). 
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which fear-based provocation and imperfect self-defense claims overlap, 
but in others, they might not, as the discussion of the Menendez case 
suggests.  This conclusion demonstrates that both of these doctrines are 
necessary as they provide distinct and cumulative grounds for mitigation. 
Finally, from a normative perspective, fear-based provocation is 
preferable to imperfect self-defense.  Since self-defense is predicated 
on the theory of justification, the implication of accepting the claim is 
a normative determination that the defendant’s act of killing was 
justified.294  An imperfect self-defense claim therefore implies that the 
defendant is partially justified, because he or she reacted unreasonably.295  
In contrast, most commentators agree that provocation rests on the 
theory of partial excuse, rather than on partial justification.296  Recognizing 
fear-based provocation means that the law acknowledges that fearful 
killers ought to be partially excused, given their impaired judgment, even 
if the killing is not partially justified.  The normative difference between 
the justificatory and excusatory bases is critical; the theory of partial 
excuse is preferable because it retains the normative conclusion that 
the defendant’s killing is still wrong.  The fearful killer is only partially 
excused because the law recognizes that the killer’s overreaction, given 
the emotional state of fear of physical harm, makes the killer less morally 
culpable compared to an actor who did not experience such fear.  Fear-
based provocation is therefore more compatible with the premise that 
the value of the sanctity of life is superior to other values, even if the 
law recognizes that some defendants ought to be partially excused if 
they find themselves in predicaments that they subjectively, but 
                                               
 294. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 487 (4th ed. 2015) (highlighting a 
North Carolina Supreme Court opinion that stressed the need for an imminent threat 
to justify a self-defense homicide). 
 295. See, e.g., Steffani J. Saitow, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome:  Does the “Reasonable 
Battered Woman” Exist?, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 329, 360–61 
(1993) (considering the imperfect self-defense doctrine in the context of battered 
women who kill their abusers). 
 296. Voluminous scholarship is devoted to discussing whether provocation is an 
excuse or a justification.  See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 15, at 971 (asserting that 
provocation is a partial excuse defense); Joshua Dressler, Provocation:  Partial 
Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467, 475 (1988) (arguing that the extent 
of provocation’s wrongfulness plays a role in deciding if the killer’s response is 
excusable).  But see Berman & Farrell, supra note 28, at 1034 (acknowledging that some 
commentators understand that provocation has both excusatory and justificatory 
aspects and advocating that provocation should be considered both a partial excuse 
and a partial justification); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 18, at 307–08 (1996) 
(advocating for an evaluative understanding of criminal law defenses, including 
provocation and self-defense, that evaluates and judges defendants’ actions and reasons). 
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unreasonably, perceived as posing deadly threats.  In light of the distinct 
bases, which imperfect self-defense and provocation are predicated upon, 
the defenses should not be viewed as mutually exclusive but instead as 
supplemental.  Therefore, the jury should be instructed on both defenses.297 
III.    THEORIZING FEAR 
Having identified the necessity for recognizing fear-based provocation, this 
part provides the theoretical basis for adding a fear prong to the defense by 
delving into some of the psychological findings that explain why such an 
expansion is warranted.  It begins with considering the psychological 
research on fear, and particularly, how fear affects individuals’ decision 
making, then moves to examine the implications of these psychological 
insights on the scope of fear-based provocation. 
A.   The Psychology of Fear 
Early psychological research has focused exclusively on cognitive-
based processes, emphasizing intellectual and thinking processes and 
ignoring the role that emotions play in influencing individuals’ 
decision making.298  In recent years, psychological research has 
increasingly grown, particularly the subfield of the effects of emotion 
on individuals’ judgment and decision making (JDM).299  Ample research 
now examines the interplay between emotion and cognition, 
acknowledging that they are deeply intertwined and investigating the 
powerful influence of their effect on actors’ behavioral choices.300 
Although psychologists identify distinct mechanisms and thought 
patterns associated with anger and fear, some common features 
underlie both; psychologists now agree that both anger and fear 
potently, pervasively, and predictably influence individuals’ decision 
                                               
 297. See infra Part IV, for a proposal to make self-defense and fear-based provocation 
cumulative rather than alternative claims. 
 298. See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 
799, 800 (2015).  The psychological literature uses the acronym “JDM” to refer to this 
subfield of judgment and decision making.  Id. (highlighting the traditional focus of 
psychological research to contrast it with the new JDM model). 
 299. Id. 
 300. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence:  Toward a Model 
of Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgment and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 473 
(2000) (arguing that emotions result from a tendency to perceive new events the same 
way as prior events were perceived).  The term “affect” in psychology refers to the 
experience of emotion and the interaction with stimuli. 
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making.301  Decision making processes consist of “perception, 
understanding, reasoning, and choice,” all of which are influenced by 
experiencing the intense emotions of anger and fear.302  Furthermore, 
these emotions may constitute harmful drivers of decision making, 
“often produc[ing] influences that are unwanted and nonconscious.”303  
They induce responses, including behavioral ones, “that enable the 
individual to deal quickly with encountered problems or opportunities.”304  
Psychological research shows that emotions impact decision making in a 
way that can override otherwise sensible courses of action and that 
both anger and fear may significantly undermine rational decision 
making, obscuring reason and judgment.305  Professor Terry Maroney 
observed the relationship between the psychological research and the 
law, noting that research establishes that emotions can sometimes have 
a disruptive effect and that their presence may disturb rationality.306 
Examining how fear operates, researchers observe that individuals’ 
decision making processes, when faced with threatening situations, 
include perception of the risk, appraisal of the risk, formation of 
relevant beliefs about the situation, and choice of a course of action.307  
These stages are all adversely affected by the experience of extreme 
fear, leading individuals to make irrational decisions that they would 
not have made but for their perception of extreme risk.308  
Psychological research also finds that fear often generates a nearly 
automatic response, including striking out.309  Furthermore, research 
suggests that fear, and the reactions to it, are almost involuntary and 
difficult to “cognitively override.”310 
                                               
 301. Lerner et al., supra note 298, at 816. 
 302. See Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,” and the 
Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1392 (2006). 
 303. Lerner et al., supra note 298, at 816. 
 304. Lerner & Keltner, supra note 300, at 476 and accompanying notes. 
 305. See George F. Lowenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 269 (2001) 
(arguing that emotions can cause almost uncontrollably destructive behavior in the face of 
cognitive evaluation); see also Sherman & Hoffman, supra note 88, at 499 (arguing that the 
doctrine of self-defense assumes that emotions have an effect on decision making). 
 306. See Maroney, supra note 302, at 1403. 
 307. See Sherman & Hoffman, supra note 88, at 511 (contending that fear shares the 
same mental process as anger and all other emotions). 
 308. Id. 
 309. See Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Intact Performance on an Indirect Measure of Race Bias 
Following Amygdala Damage, 41 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 203, 203–04 (2003) (explaining that the 
part of the brain responsible for fear is subject to nearly automatic responses to stimuli). 
 310. Maroney, supra note 302, at 1407. 
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While anger and fear share some notable common features, social 
psychologist Jennifer Lerner and her colleagues’ research found that 
even though both anger and fear are negative emotions of the same 
valence, there are important differences in the thought processes that 
underlie them.311  This research compared the operation of anger and 
fear, examining how these emotions shape the content of thought via 
appraisal tendencies.312  Drawing on what they refer to as appraisal 
tendency framework, they found that anger and fear can exert 
opposing influences on choices and judgment.313  In other studies that 
examine risk-taking, Lerner and her colleagues compared risk 
perceptions of angry and fearful people.314  They found that angry people 
view negative events as predictably caused by, and under the control of, 
other individuals.315  They also found that fearful people generally made 
pessimistic judgments of future events.316  They further demonstrated that 
fear involves low certainty, powerlessness, and a low sense of control over 
the situation, which are likely to produce a perception of negative events 
as unpredictable and situationally determined.317  In sum, these research 
findings demonstrate that fearful individuals consistently made 
judgments and choices that were relatively pessimistic and amplified their 
perception of risk in a given situation, in contrast to angry participants who 
were more likely to disregard risks.318 
Since psychologists now agree that emotions serve “an adaptive 
coordination role” that trigger a set of behavioral responses,319 one 
important implication of these research findings concerns individuals’ 
resulting behavioral responses to fear.  Psychological researcher 
Joseph Cesario notes that the behavioral outcomes of fear may consist 
of five distinct responses, including flee, freeze, hide, attack, and assess 
risk.320  While lay societal perceptions often assume that fear is more likely 
                                               
 311. Lerner et al., supra note 298, at 804. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 804–05 (defining appraisal tendency framework as “a multidimensional theoretical 
framework for linking specific emotions to specific judgment and decision making outcomes”). 
 314. Lerner & Keltner, supra note 300, at 473. 
 315. Id. at 47. 
 316. Lerner & Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
146, 147 (observing that similar patterns were found in subsequent studies in which 
they experimentally induced participants to feel anger and fear). 
 317. Lerner & Keltner, supra note 300, at 478–79. 
 318. Id. at 480. 
 319. See Lerner et al., supra note 298, at 808. 
 320. See Joseph Cesario et al., The Ecology of Automaticity:  How Situational Contingencies 
Shape Action Semantics and Social Behavior, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1311, 1312 (2010). 
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to result in a flee or freeze response rather than in aggression, Cesario 
found that the more common responses to fear are either flight or fight.321 
In addition, psychological research finds that the particular reaction 
taken in response to fear depends on multiple features stemming from 
the circumstances underlying the threatening situation, including the 
nature, size, and distance of the threat, the possibility and ease of 
escaping or hiding from the threat, and the clarity of the threat.322  
Other research suggests that there are also gender-based, social, and 
cultural aspects determining the response to fear.323  For example, 
women are more likely to scream or call for help while men are more 
likely to physically attack in a similar circumstances.324 
Another research finding pertains to the duration of experiencing 
fear.  In general, researchers agree that full-blown emotions are 
commonly short-lived, and that fear, specifically, is often an acute, 
sudden, and short-lived reaction to an immediate threat.325  While 
“[e]motions are initially elicited rapidly and can trigger swift action,” 
psychological research also recognizes that once activated, “some 
emotions . . . can trigger more systemic thoughts.”326  Consequently, 
researchers now “distinguish[] between the cognitive consequences of 
an emotion-elicitation phase and an emotion-persistence phase.”327  
Furthermore, researchers note that fear sometimes carries ongoing 
consequences—particularly that fear and anticipatory anxiety about a 
future dangerous event may linger longer in circumstances where a 
person has been subjected to continuous abuse for an extended period 
                                               
 321. See id. (highlighting that responses to stimuli are affected by the form of the 
stimuli and the recipient’s relationship to the stimulating behavior). 
 322. Elise J. Percy at al., “Sticky Metaphors” and the Persistence of the Traditional 
Voluntary Manslaughter Doctrine, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 383, 419 (2011). 
 323. See D. Caroline Blanchard et al., Human Defensive Behaviors to Threat Scenarios Show 
Parallels to Fear- and Anxiety-Related Defense Patterns of Non-Human Mammals, 25 NEUROSCIENCE 
& BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 761, 761 (2001) (using rats in an experiment that revealed that rats 
will engage in defensive-attack behavior if they are unable to flee when under threat). 
 324. Id. at 767. 
 325. See Robert W. Levenson, Human Emotion:  A Functional View, in THE NATURE OF 
EMOTION FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 123 (Paul Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 
1994) (maintaining that the purpose of emotions is to provide a rapid adaptation to 
environmental changes); see also George Loewenstein, Out of Control:  Visceral Influences 
on Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 272 (1996) (observing 
the powerful effect of adaptation and the fact that most individuals’ emotional states 
return to their baseline states over time). 
 326. Lerner et al., supra note 298, at 816–17. 
 327. Id. at 817. 
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of time.328  In such cases, the longevity of the psychological repercussions 
of past physical abuse continues to have an impact on some individuals’ 
future perception of risk.329  A growing body of research suggests that 
victims of long-term physical and emotional abuse experience a variety of 
symptoms long after the actual abuse has ended, including fear, anxiety, 
stress, and anger.330  For example, severe past trauma and abuse that 
results in intense fear may cause long-term stress, negatively affecting 
all areas of functioning.331  Research further shows that domestic 
violence victims suffer from a host of serious long-term mental health 
problems even after separating from abusive partners, including 
depression, anxiety, and PTSD.332  Moreover, the traumatic effects of 
physical abuse are especially exacerbated in the case of spousal abuse 
due to the fact that the abused person is emotionally involved with the 
abuser, therefore further explaining why fear may linger on, even 
when the threat of harm has been completely removed.333 
Taken together, psychological research on the effects of fear, 
including its possible lingering impact, suggests that while the 
behavioral consequences of fear are more varied and complex than 
those of anger, fear, similarly to anger, may also lead to aggressive, 
possibly lethal, behaviors.334  Put differently, one of the irrational 
decisions that fearful individuals may make is an act of killing. 
                                               
 328. Catherine Cerulli et al., “What Fresh Hell Is This?”  Victims of Intimate Partner 
Violence Describe Their Experiences of Abuse, Pain, and Depression, 27 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 773, 
778 (2012) (finding that victims of physical abuse describe psychological symptoms, 
including depression, anxiety, panic attacks and flashbacks lasting even beyond the 
abuse and after criminal prosecution of the abuser). 
 329. See ILSA EVANS, BATTLE-SCARS:  LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF PRIOR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 4 (2007) (indicating that the effects of domestic violence affect sufferers in 
multiple facets of their lives long after the initial trauma). 
 330. Id. at 14. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See, e.g., Carole Warshaw et al., Mental Health Consequences of Intimate Partner 
Violence, in INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE:  A HEALTH-BASED PERSPECTIVE (Connie Mitchell & 
Deirdre Anglin eds., 2009); Debra Houry et al., Intimate Partner Violence and Mental Health 
Symptoms in African American Female ED Patients, 24 AM. J. OF EMERGENCY MED. 444, 445 
(2006); DeJonghe ES et al., Women Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence and Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder:  Prediction and Prevention, 54 J. OF POSTGRADUATE MED. 294, 294 (2008). 
 333. Evans, supra note 329, at 13–14. 
 334. See Cesario, supra note 320, at 1314 (showing that an individual could be 
pushed toward an automatic response of fight or flight solely depending on the 
location and circumstances of the stimuli). 
1776 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1673 
 
A final point concerns the interrelationship between anger and fear.  
Legal doctrines typically treat anger and fear as distinct emotions.335  
Psychologists, however, disagree with the law’s dichotomy, finding that 
from a psychological perspective, there is often an overlap between 
experiencing anger and fear.336  Psychiatrists note that the legal 
assumption that anger and fear are distinct emotions is mistaken 
because the two emotions share many similarities from a medical 
perspective.337  They stress that “physiologically anger and fear are 
virtually identical” and that “many mental states that accompany killing 
also incorporate psychologically both anger and fear.”338  Therefore, 
medical and psychological research demonstrates the failings of the 
legal assumption that fear and anger may be treated differently for the 
purpose of creating separate defense doctrines.339 
B.   Psychological Research’s Implications for Fear-Based Provocation 
Psychological research findings offer important insights on the 
scope of the provocation defense, and particularly on recognizing fear-
based provocation.  Understanding how fear affects a person’s judgment 
and decision making processes explains why the prevalent perception of 
provocation as an anger-based defense proves unfit for accommodating 
the experiences of fearful killers.  Since provocation’s elements are 
incompatible with the way fear operates, even in jurisdictions that do not 
view provocation and self-defense as mutually exclusive, fearful killers 
trying to rely on provocation are often unsuccessful. 
The subsections below elaborate on the three main features that 
defendants who kill out of fear experience:  (1) fear results in interference 
with defendants’ reasoning and judgment processes; (2) fear is often 
cumulative, simmering slowly over a prolonged time period; and  
(3) fear might linger for long periods, resulting in a failure to cool off, 
even with lapse of time.  While these three factors are critical for 
                                               
 335. See supra Part II.B (noting that legal scholars mostly address fear through the 
self-defense doctrine and anger through the lens of provocation).  But cf. Pillsbury, supra 
note 16, at 147–48 (acknowledging that fear and anger can be difficult to disentangle 
and often defendants experience both). 
 336. See English Law Comm’n, supra note 247, at 53 (citing the British Royal College 
of Psychiatrists, Response to Consultation Paper No. 173, for the proposition that 
anger and fear are not distinct emotions).  This finding, among others, led the authors 
to recommend that British law also recognize fear as triggering provocation defense. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
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recognizing fear-based provocation, they are currently not embedded 
in existing understanding of anger-based provocation. 
1. Fear-based provocation’s rationale:  impaired judgment 
Psychological research reveals that intense fear may result in significantly 
impaired thought processes, leading defendants to act out of distorted 
reasoning and judgment.  Acknowledging that fear undermines rational 
judgment explains why fearful people might kill.  Yet, as previously noted, the 
main rationale upon which anger-based provocation is predicated is the 
notion of loss of control.340  This model, however, is unsuitable to capture the 
distinct features characterizing the typical responses of fearful killers. 
One implication of the psychological finding that fear may impair 
rational judgment is that fear does not necessarily result in a visible 
response that may be characterized as loss of control.  In fact, fearful 
killers may outwardly appear calm, cool, composed, and in control of 
their actions.341  Defendants who externally exhibit visible signs of 
control of their emotions may lead decision makers to conclude 
mistakenly that these defendants killed in acts of calculated and 
deliberate revenge, seeking personal vendetta against the deceased 
individuals who wronged them.  But in fact, these fearful killers might 
have killed as a result of significant distortion in their judgment and 
rational thinking.  Predicating the provocation defense on the loss of 
control rationale therefore raises a concern regarding disparate 
treatment of angry and fearful killers.  Angry defendants whose behavior 
is externally manifested as an impulsive act of loss of control might be 
treated more favorably than fearful killers whose typical response 
might be perceived by decision makers as the exact opposite of loss of 
control that is as deliberate and calculated. 
Shifting provocation’s focal point from loss of control towards the 
destruction of reasoning and judgment provides a coherent rationale 
for recognizing fear-based provocation.342  Conceding that a fearful 
killer’s thought process has been significantly distorted as a result of 
the deceased’s threatening behavior offers normative grounds for 
                                               
 340. See supra Part I.A. 
 341. See supra Part II.A–B (demonstrating courts’ emphasis on fearful defendants’ 
appearance at the time of the killing and the external manifestation of cold, 
calculated, and in control reaction). 
 342. Cf. Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 289, 297–98 (2003) (proposing a new “generic mitigating excuse” for 
defendants who are guilty of killing but acted, at least partially, responsible based on 
their lack of capacity for rationality). 
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mitigation.  When defendants kill in response to such threats, their 
moral culpability is diminished compared to defendants who kill in 
other circumstances.343  Put differently, when distortion in a defendant’s 
judgment is powerful enough, it is sufficient to make the act of killing 
far less morally culpable than it would have been absent such 
distortion.  Since a defendant’s ability to rationally assess the situation 
is significantly undermined by the impact of fear, mitigating charges 
from murder to manslaughter is warranted. 
Emphasizing the impact of fear on defendants’ decision making 
processes is also consistent with a basic tenet of criminal law, under 
which the degree of criminal liability ought to be derivative and 
proportional to the degree of defendants’ moral culpability.344  
Recognizing fear-based provocation would allow the law to reflect 
proper gradations of criminal culpability based on varying levels of 
moral blameworthiness.  Reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter, 
rather than completely acquitting of any crime, reflects prevailing 
societal perceptions that killing in circumstances falling short of self-
defense still warrants criminal penalty.345  But at the same time, it 
acknowledges that a defendant whose cognitive and volitional capabilities 
were significantly impaired is not as morally culpable as one whose 
capabilities remained intact. 
Additionally, conceding that both anger and fear may distort rational 
judgments should also take into consideration the fact that the psychological 
reality is that these emotions sometimes overlap, operating jointly.346  
Grounding a defense on decision makers’ determination of whether the 
killer was primarily angry or primarily fearful is inherently problematic 
because it lacks support in psychological research.  Since in some cases the 
same deceased’s behavior that angers a defendant also establishes the 
defendant’s fear of physical violence, legal doctrine ought to acknowledge 
                                               
 343. See generally Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1559 (1999) (observing that moral culpability depends 
on “whether we intend to do wrong, know that wrong will occur, or have reason to 
predict that we will do wrong” and concluding that culpability depends on whether a 
defendant was able to reasonably assess the information to determine that his actions 
would be wrong). 
 344. See generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME:  A GENERAL THEORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 192 (1997) (noting that culpability is both necessary and sufficient as a basis 
for criminal punishment). 
 345. See supra notes 257–258 (discussing the lack of recognition of imperfect self-
defense under common law and in many jurisdictions).  
 346. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (describing psychiatrists’ consensus 
that fear and anger often overlap). 
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that provocation may often be triggered by an indistinguishable combination 
of fear and anger.  If both anger and fear may destruct defendants’ rational 
judgment, even if such destruction is differently manifested, there is no 
principled basis for the law’s privileging one emotion over the other.  Anger 
and fear ought to be similarly treated, with both providing grounds for 
mitigation of murder charges to manslaughter. 
2.  The cumulative impact of fear 
The provocation defense was traditionally not available to defendants 
who were subjected to multiple provoking acts over an extended period 
of time.347  Existing provocation doctrine still envisions a raging defendant 
who has undertaken a spontaneous act of aggression, triggered by a single 
and sudden provoking event.  Only a minority of jurisdictions recognize 
the notion of cumulative provocation, namely the additive effect of 
previous multiple physical abuses as adequate provocation culminating in 
the killing.348  A key impediment to incorporating a fear-based trigger into 
existing provocation defense lies with many jurisdictions’ refusal to 
recognize the cumulative effect of a series of triggering incidents, 
increasingly building up over a long period of time.349  Since many 
jurisdictions define provocation as requiring a sudden and serious incident, 
a series of past provoking incidents in the course of prolonged abuse would 
not satisfy this requirement.350  This is especially apparent when defendants 
kill following the deceased’s threat to kill in the future, but given previous 
threats of a similar nature, the specific threat preceding the killing is not 
deemed in itself sudden and sufficiently serious.351 
Psychological research demonstrates that particularly in cases of 
domestic abuse, a killing may result from a “slow burn” reaction to fear 
                                               
 347. See Belew, supra note 115, at 793–96, 800–01 (noting that the accumulated fear 
battered women experience is not considered a “sudden” loss of control as required 
by traditional provocation law, but that some English courts recognize cumulative 
provocation where there is evidence of battering and “slow burn” response). 
 348. Examples of jurisdictions that recognize cumulative provocation include 
Pennsylvania and California.  See, e.g., People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780–81 (Cal. 1976) 
(recognizing the cumulative effect of verbal taunting as adequate provocation); 
Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 782 (Pa. 1989) (recognizing the cumulative 
effect of deceased’s abusive behavior as sufficient provocation). 
 349. See Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 166 (noting that provocation doctrine insists on 
a cooling off period, preventing defendants who experience multiple provoking 
incidents from asserting the defense). 
 350. See supra Part II.A.1 (examining instances of killing after prolonged abuse). 
 351. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the 
deceased made continuous threats towards the defendant over time). 
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of an abuser, accumulating over a prolonged time period of abuse.352  
Case law further illustrates that domestically battered people who were 
subjected to physical abuse for a long time may kill their abusers in 
response to many past abusive incidents.353  In these circumstances, the 
killing is the culmination of slow simmering of multiple incidents, 
which are often part of a repetitive pattern of abuse that gradually 
builds up over time.  Provocation law’s emphasis on the suddenness of 
the triggering incident proves inapt in cases where defendants did not 
react in response to one serious sudden incident but rather in response 
to the cumulative effect of a series of actual or threatened violence. 
3. The lingering effect of fear 
The cooling off requirement presents an additional obstacle for 
fearful killers trying to establish the elements of the provocation 
defense.  Since provocation doctrine requires a sudden act, the 
presence of a cooling off period typically negates any mitigating effect 
which the provocation might have had.354  Most courts require that a 
relatively short interval—often only a few minutes—occur between the 
provocation and the killing.355 
While many jurisdictions have relaxed the cooling off requirement, 
leaving the issue to the jury, the impact of this element persists as juries 
might reject the defense in cases where they believe that there was 
sufficient time for the defendant’s passions to cool off.356  Despite many 
                                               
 352. See Martin Wasik, Cumulative Provocation and Domestic Killing, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 
29, 30 (1982) (on file with American University Law Review); see also English Law 
Comm’n, supra note 247, at 51–51 (discussing defendants who killed their abusers after 
being subjected to prolonged and continuous physical abuse).  
 353. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding 
a trial court jury instruction that a series of provoking events over a period of time may 
be sufficient to create heat of passion); see also EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 11 (2d ed. 1996) (demonstrating 
the prevalence and extreme consequences of domestic violence). 
 354. See, e.g., People v. Fiorentino, 91 N.E. 195, 196 (N.Y. 1910) (emphasizing a 
charge of first degree murder will not be mitigated if the defendant acted with 
premeditation and deliberation after having time to cool off). 
 355. See, e.g., Caroline A. Forell & Donna M. Matthews, A LAW OF HER OWN:  THE 
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 176 (2000) (noting that while court 
generally adhere to the cooling off requirement, many courts stretch the cooling off 
time when men kill their intimates). 
 356. See People v. Millbrook, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 217, 231 (Ct. App. 2014) (discussing 
whether the defendant had sufficient time to cool off); Nourse, supra note 62, at 1244 
(commenting that even today, there is a line conceived in time that marks the 
difference between murder and provoked homicide). 
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jurisdictions’ shifting from a stringent cooling off requirement towards 
evaluating the lapse of time factor under reasonableness standards, 
provocation’s temporal requirement still presents a significant hurdle 
for fearful killers attempting to raise the provocation defense.357  This 
enduring limitation fails to take into account the psychological 
research findings that fear may carry lingering effects.358 
Commentators observe that even if the temporal requirement is 
modified, existing emphasis on the jury’s evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s reaction to the provoking incident 
remains problematic, especially for killers who are women.359  
Additionally, the cooling off requirement has proven especially 
problematic for people who suffered domestic abuse, often women, 
who endured long term terror by their abusers.360  These abused people 
may first exhibit symptoms of depression and desperation and react 
violently only after a lapse of time between the last battering incident 
and the killing.361  The problem is especially apparent when these 
defendants kill their abusers in non-confrontational circumstances, 
                                               
 357. This proves a significant obstacle in jurisdictions that incorporate the 
suddenness requirement into the statutory definition of voluntary manslaughter, such 
as Ohio where murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter only if defendant proves 
that the homicide occurred while under the influence of sudden passion or in a 
sudden fit of rage.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (West 2013).  Ohio courts refuse 
to give voluntary manslaughter jury instructions based on fear-based provocation, 
holding that past abusive incidents or previous verbal threats do not satisfy the test for 
reasonably sufficient provocation since there was sufficient time for cooling off.  See, 
e.g., State v. Parnell, No. 11AP-257, 2011 WL 6647293, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 
2011) (finding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on 
provocation based on the defendant’s fear); State v. Adcox, No. 98CA007049, 2000 WL 
422400, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2000) (holding the trial court did not err in 
refusing to give instruction on aggravated assault where the defendant contended that 
he acted in self-defense based on his assertion that he was afraid because the deceased 
was wielding a knife). 
 358. See supra Part III.A. 
 359. See LEE, supra note 19, at 46–52 (discussing prevalent assumptions regarding 
the reasonableness of women defendants). 
 360. See Pillsbury, supra note 16, at 166. 
 361. See, e.g., CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL:  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 61 (1987); Charles Patrick Ewing, Psychological 
Self-Defense:  A Proposed Justification for Battered Women Who Kill, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
579, 586–90 (1990) (proposing an expansion of the self-defense doctrine for battered 
women who kill their abusers after enduring extreme psychological abuse); Kit 
Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change:  A Reply to the Critics of Battered Women’s Self-
Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 181–83 (2004) (explaining that battered 
women may feel that they can properly protect themselves only once the abuse has 
stopped, such as when the abuser is asleep). 
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such as when the abusers were sleeping since the defendants had 
ample time to cool off after the most recent battering incident.362  The 
current view of the provocation defense, with its deeply embedded 
assumption that passage of time provides defendants with sufficient 
time to cool off and regain back control, is inconsistent with the actual 
experiences of these fearful killers. 
The judicial reluctance to acknowledge the lingering effects of fear is 
incompatible with the psychological research.363  This research buttresses 
abused defendants’ claims that their continuous abuse placed them in 
a perpetual state of terror that never dissipated, and that their reactive 
aggression was a response to extreme fear of future violence by the 
abuser.364  This research further rebuts the myth that time heals all 
wounds, supporting battered defendants’ perceptions of long-lasting 
fear.  In sum, the elements of existing provocation defense demonstrate 
that current law is not informed by the psychological research on how fear 
operates and its lingering impact. 
IV.    THE ELEMENTS OF FEAR-BASED PROVOCATION 
Recognizing that fear distorts defendants’ rational judgment not 
only provides a framework for fear-based provocation but it also calls 
for reconstructing the elements of provocation to take this fear into 
account by determining its effect on defendants’ behavior.365  The sections 
                                               
 362. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1135 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) 
(detailing how the defendant shot her abusive partner while he was watching 
television); State v. Urena, 899 A.2d 1281, 1284 (R.I. 2006) (explaining that the 
defendant left her house to avoid escape her abusive boyfriend, but stabbed him later 
that night after he followed her to her friend’s house). 
 363. See supra Part III.A. 
 364. See ROBBIN S. OGLE & SUSAN JACOBS, SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN WHO 
KILL:  A NEW FRAMEWORK, 120–21 (2002) (noting that battered woman’s heightened 
sensitivity to danger from their intimate abusers may cause an apprehension of future 
danger, even in non-confrontational situations); see also SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING 
EVIL:  RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER, 142–44 (1998) (observing 
that traditional provocation doctrine presents significant obstacles in cases where 
abused women kill their abusers not in response to immediate violence but instead, 
after exceeding the time limit of the cooling off period). 
 365. By proposing that the elements of fear-based provocation take into account 
cumulative fear and the lingering effect of fear, I am nowhere suggesting that the 
elements of anger-based provocation should not recognize the effect of cumulative 
anger and the fact that in some circumstances, defendants’ anger may linger for a long 
time, without cooling off.  Since this Article focuses on fear as an additional qualifying 
trigger for provocation, elaborating on the notions of cumulative anger and on the fact 
that anger, just like fear, may linger over time, exceed the scope of this paper.  For now, 
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below consider the potential implications that the psychological insights 
might have on the scope of the provocation doctrine by outlining the 
two key prongs of fear-based provocation. 
A.   The Subjective Prong:  Fear Resulting in Impaired Judgment 
The subjective component of fear-based provocation would first 
require defendants to prove that they acted in response to fear of 
violence threatened against them by the deceased.366  Evidence would 
have to establish that the impact of this fear was so powerful that it 
overwhelmed the defendant’s thought process, resulting in substantial 
distortion in rational judgment and reasoning mechanisms.367  Such 
evidence offers the first step in meeting the subjective prong because 
it recognizes that fear impairs judgment, which is the underlying 
rationale for fear-based provocation. 
In addition, defendants would have to prove that they responded to 
fear of physical harm as opposed to other types of fear, such as fear of 
infliction of emotional pain, economic harm, reputational harm, 
perception of honor violation, or fear related to custody battles.368  The 
threat of physical harm serves as a limiting mechanism that excludes from 
the scope of the provocation defense threats of a non-physical nature.  In 
contrast to self-defense, however, the harm threatened does not necessarily 
have to be deadly harm, as long as it is serious harm of a physical nature. 
While evidence that defendants’ fear obscured their judgment is necessary 
to prove fear-based provocation, it is not sufficient.  Additionally, fear-based 
provocation’s subjective prong should encompass an additional feature that 
limits the scope of the defense, namely that the aggression must be in 
                                               
however, suffice it to say that I believe that anger-based provocation should also be 
expanded to recognize cumulative anger, and that anger also may linger over time.  For a 
comparative perspective on adding fear as an additional prong to trigger provocation 
under English law, see CORONERS AND JUSTICE ACT 2009, c. 25, Part 2, Ch. 1, § 55 (Eng.). 
 366. The defense might also recognize that the defendant acted not only in 
response to threat against them but also against another individual, most notably, a 
family member or a close friend. This possibility calls for considering who else, beyond 
family members, ought to be covered here.  I leave this issue for another paper. 
 367. Cf. People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1130 (Cal. 2013) (elaborating on the elements 
of California’s anger-based provocation, which focus on whether the defendant 
experienced such intense emotional provocation that it obscured any reason or judgment). 
 368. But see People v. Wright, 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115, 142–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) 
(holding that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter based on the defendant’s claim that her non-abusive boyfriend would 
take custody of their child, but that the error was harmless because there was sufficient 
evidence that the killing was deliberated and premeditated). 
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response to a specified threatening behavior by the deceased.369  Arguably, 
tethering the defendant’s reaction to the deceased’s alleged wrongdoing 
might be conceived as problematic in a modern era that categorically rejects 
victim blaming strategies in criminal trials.  This concern becomes even more 
apparent when individuals were killed and cannot respond to the 
defendants’ portrayal of the events.370  Contemporary understandings of 
provocation have partially abandoned the previous focus on identifying 
deceased’s wrongdoing, instead shifting most of the inquiry to the 
defendant’s loss of control.371  Incorporating the deceased’s wrongdoing 
into the defense thus raises some concern that it implicates notions of the 
deceased’s fault, implying that the killing was somehow justified. 
Conceding that making deceased’s wrongdoing a part of the defense 
raises some discomfort, I posit that not only is it already embedded, 
but that other important considerations outweigh this concern.  The 
requirement that the defendant react in response to the deceased’s 
physically threatening behavior is necessary because it adds a much-
needed normative component to limit the operation of fear-based 
provocation.  It is also one of the features that distinguishes fear-based 
provocation from the EED defense which does not require any 
deceased’s wrongdoing and was rejected by most jurisdictions.372 
A host of mental problems may similarly affect an individual’s behavior, 
resulting in homicide.373  Specifically, an individual may suffer from 
impaired judgment and distortion in rational thinking due to reasons 
unrelated to the deceased’s behavior.  Grounding fear-based provocation 
on a defendant’s fear alone, without requiring that the fear stems from 
the deceased’s threat of violence, would result in allowing jurors to 
                                               
 369. The requirement that defendant’s fear stems from the deceased’s threatening 
violence also raises the question of misdirected retaliation, namely, situations where 
the defendant mistakenly killed an innocent third party rather than the person who 
placed him or her in fear.  Elaborating on whether fear-based provocation should also 
cover cases of misdirected retaliation exceeds the scope of this paper. 
 370. See generally Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs:  The Case for a General Criminal Defense 
Based on Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 645, 646–
49 (2003) (discussing how self-defense and other justification defenses serve as “formal 
victim blaming doctrines in criminal law”). 
 371. In addition, this shift has resulted in the prevalent view that provocation is a 
partial excuse rather than partial justification.  For an extensive scholarly discussion 
on the nature of the provocation defense as an excuse or a justification, see generally 
Berman & Farrell, supra note 28, at 1045–65. 
 372. See supra Part I.B (discussing EED, which does not require that the triggering 
incident stem from deceased’s wrongdoing). 
 373. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1317 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that defendant’s 
mental disability was peculiar to him and unworthy of mitigation). 
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recognize the defendant’s unique personal idiosyncrasies, such as 
possessing an especially fearful personality, as basis for mitigation.  In 
some cases, these idiosyncrasies may amount to personality disorders 
that are characterized by anxious and fearful thinking or behavior.374  
Reducing the charges based on fear-based provocation in these 
circumstances is unwarranted because the underlying rationale for 
mitigation in such cases would have been defendants’ specific mental 
disorders rather than genuine fear of the deceased’s infliction of 
violence.  The addition of a fear prong as a basis for mitigation is not 
predicated on incorporating defendants’ mental abnormalities into 
the provocation defense.  Fear-based provocation excludes such cases 
from the scope of the defense, acknowledging that they might be 
separately addressed as part of a different defense, which is predicated 
on mental disorders.375 
Rather than grounding a defense in defendants’ emotional and 
mental disorders, the basis for fear-based provocation rests on a 
temporary distortion of rational judgment stemming from actual 
physical threats.  Recognizing that a defendant acted in direct response 
to fear of the deceased’s threat of violence draws a normative line 
between cases where the defendant might be partially excused because 
fear provoked the killing and those in which other reasons, unrelated 
to the deceased’s threatening behavior, distorted rational judgment. 
Finally, as psychological research suggests, fear and anger are not 
completely separate emotions and might operate jointly in impairing 
defendants’ judgments.376  In some cases, the same deceased’s conduct 
that causes defendant’s anger might also cause defendant’s fear.  
Recognizing fear-based provocation should correspond to the 
psychological understanding that fear and anger are not mutually 
exclusive emotions and that sometimes both emotions may overlap.  
The fact that defendants acted out of fear for their physical safety does 
not necessarily mean that they were not also angry.  The reconstructed 
                                               
 374. Psychiatry classifies personality disorders into three categories with Cluster C 
personality disorders further divided into three subcategories:  avoidant personality 
disorder, dependent personality disorder and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder.  
See Personality Disorders, MAYO CLINIC (Jun. 12, 2018, 8:26 PM) http://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
diseases-conditions/personality-disorders/symptoms-causes/dxc-20247656. 
 375. I leave open here the question of under what circumstances mitigating charges 
for defendants with mental disorders is normatively warranted.  Further elaborating 
on this issue exceeds the scope of this Article. 
 376. See supra notes 304–306 and accompanying text. 
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provocation defense ought to provide that the defendant acted in 
response to either anger, fear, or their combination. 
B.   The Objective Prong:  A Person of Average Disposition Standard 
Fear-based provocation’s subjective prong rests on a descriptive 
psychological understanding of fear’s negative effect on defendants’ 
judgments.  Yet, a subjective component in itself does not provide 
decision makers with any guidance as to which types of impaired 
judgments warrant mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter.  
From a normative perspective, adding an objective prong to the 
elements of fear-based provocation is necessary to constrain the 
operation of the subjective prong. 
The objective prong would compare a defendant’s aggressive reaction 
to that of an ordinary person, meaning a person of average disposition, in 
the same situation.  The ordinary person is different from a reasonable 
person because an act of killing is never considered reasonable absent self-
defense.377  This ordinary person possesses ordinary temperament, 
tolerance, and self-restraint, and is similarly situated with respect to 
defendant’s sex, age, and circumstances.378  By measuring a defendant’s 
response against that of a person of average disposition, the objective 
prong encompasses a necessary normative component which guides 
juries in considering whether the defendant’s fear and reaction, given 
the specific circumstances, warrant mitigation.  This view further aligns 
with other defenses that criminal law recognizes, such as duress, which 
also include similarly normative determinations.379 
Measuring a defendant’s response to that of an ordinary person with 
average disposition calls for considering whether this standard should 
rest on evaluating the defendant’s fear, or rather his or her act of 
                                               
 377. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 532, 534 (providing several examples of how jury 
instructions have articulated the reasonable or ordinary person standard). 
 378. See People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1125 (Cal. 2013) (discussing the person 
of an average disposition standard); cf. CORONERS AND JUSTICE ACT 2009, c. 25, Part 2, 
Ch. 1, § 54-55 (Eng.) (providing a defense of loss of control, which abolishes 
traditional provocation defense and adds a fear-based prong as a “qualifying trigger” 
for the defense if the defendant can prove that the killing was the result of loss of self-
control attributable to the defendant’s fear of violence from the deceased, and 
requiring that a person of defendant’s age and sex, with a normal degree of tolerance 
and self-restraint, and in the circumstances of defendant might have reacted in the 
same or in a similar way to defendant). 
 379. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of Self-Control, 61 
EMORY L.J. 501, 552 (2012) (discussing the normative aspect of the provocation defense). 
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killing.380  Addressing this point, the California Supreme Court in 
People v. Beltran381 reaffirmed the former approach, holding that 
“emotion reasonableness” remains the correct standard for evaluating 
whether provocation was adequate.382  In this case, the defendant, a 
jealous and controlling man who had physically abused the deceased 
throughout their two-year intimate relationship, stabbed the deceased 
to death with a kitchen knife after she left him and started dating 
another man.383  The defendant was charged with murder and the trial 
court instructed the jury on both murder and voluntary manslaughter 
based on provocation.384  The court rejected the state’s position that 
the standard is whether an average person of ordinary disposition 
would necessarily kill, as the defendant had.385  Instead, it accepted the 
defense’s position that the provocation involved must cause a person 
of average disposition, in the same situation and knowing the same 
facts, to act rashly under the influence of such intense emotion that 
judgment or reasoning process was obscured.386 
The decision is likely to raise further feminist scholarly attacks on 
the provocation defense given the disturbing circumstances 
underlying the defendant’s abhorrent behavior.387  However, despite 
the defense-friendly jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, in 
Beltran, the jury did not accept the defense’s theory that the defendant 
was provoked and convicted him of second degree murder.388  Setting 
aside the specific facts of Beltran, this Article argues that the legal 
standard that was adopted is warranted and ought to be incorporated 
into fear-based provocation’s objective prong.  A fearful killer’s response 
ought to be measured against that of an ordinary person of average 
                                               
 380. See supra Part I.A. (elaborating on Lee’s distinction between “act 
reasonableness,” which focuses on whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
situation would have similarly responded by killing another person, and “emotion 
reasonableness,” inquiring into whether the defendant’s emotional outrage or passion 
was reasonable). 
 381. 301 P.3d 1120 (Cal. 2013). 
 382. Id. at 1136. 
 383. Id. at 1123–24. 
 384. Id. at 1124. 
 385. Id. at 1130–31. 
 386. Id. at 1135–36 (affirming the lower court’s jury instruction). 
 387. See Gruber, supra note 64, at 276; see also supra notes 64–84 and accompanying 
text (discussing feminist theories). 
 388. People v. Beltran, No. A124392, 2013 WL 6498987, at *18 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 
11, 2013) (showing that, on remand, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of 
second degree murder). 
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disposition who experienced similar impairment in rational thought 
process, which might have led him or her to act out of disturbed 
judgment.  A court using this framework would take into consideration 
objective factors like a defendant’s age and gender as well as other 
relevant surrounding circumstances. 
Rejecting a standard that requires that an ordinary person, in the 
defendant’s situation, would necessarily kill is consistent with the key 
rationale for recognizing fear-based provocation, namely, the 
understanding that intense fear may result in significant impairment 
in rational thinking.  Moreover, adopting a standard that requires that 
any ordinary person of similar disposition would necessarily react to 
the threat by killing, conflates the elements of self-defense and 
provocation.  Self-defense law focuses on the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s beliefs or reasons for the killing by requiring a 
determination that a reasonable person would also believe that the use 
of deadly force was necessary under similar circumstances and would 
necessarily kill the attacker.  In contrast, provocation focuses on the 
effect of intense emotions on the defendant’s judgment rather than 
on the reasonableness of the belief that the killing was necessary.  
Therefore, the standard to assess the adequacy of provocation ought 
to focus on the ordinary person experiencing intense emotion that 
similarly distorts judgment. 
C.   Potential Criticism of Fear-Based Provocation 
The proposal to recognize fear-based provocation is likely to raise a 
number of objections.  On one end of the spectrum, conservative 
scholars and proponents of “tough on crime” laws and policies are 
likely to reject any attempt to expand the scope of the provocation 
defense, arguing that the law should deter dangerous emotional 
outbursts leading to violent behavior.389  A different version of such 
objection might suggest that the law should adhere to a position that 
views all legally sane defendants as autonomous individuals, who are 
capable of exercising free will choices.390  The law’s commitment to 
nonviolence as an essential societal norm should therefore preclude 
                                               
 389. See generally Dressler, supra note 15, at 960 (noting that “one might expect law-
and-order advocates to criticize a doctrine that can permit an intentional killer to avoid 
conviction for murder”). 
 390. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 540 (observing that some critics attack the 
defense on voluntariness grounds, claiming that provoked killers find it hard to 
control themselves, rather than actually lacking the ability to do so). 
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defendants from relying on arguments that demonstrate a choice to 
devalue the sanctity of human life.391  Critics would also likely suggest 
that the proper phase for considering mitigating circumstances, such 
as fearful killers’ prolonged physical abuse, is the sentencing phase, 
rather than during the initial determination of guilt.392 
On the other end of the spectrum, liberal scholars, concerned with 
the over-punitive criminal justice system, might argue that expanding 
the basis for voluntary manslaughter convictions would result in 
disadvantaging defendants who could have benefited from a more 
flexible self-defense statute.393  These critics might further contend that 
one implication of recognizing fear-based provocation is embracing a 
“tough on crime” agenda rather than providing an additional basis for 
acquittal of any homicide offense. 
Another potential critique stems from concerns that recognizing fear-
based provocation might embolden defense attorneys’ endeavors to rely 
on questionable psychiatric testimony to establish various forms of 
“syndromes.”394  Notoriously dubbed “the abuse excuse,” defense attorneys 
previously attempted to expand the scope of self-defense doctrine by 
including additional circumstances that existing laws do not 
recognize.395  For example, defense attorneys have tried to introduce 
evidence about defendants’ fear of threatening gang members in high-
crime neighborhoods under a theory of “urban survival syndrome.”396  
                                               
 391. See generally PILLSBURY, supra note 364, at 145 (noting that a provoked killing is 
considered a crime of violence, which carries serious legal consequences). 
 392. See generally Peter Arenella, Demystifying the Abuse Excuse:  Is There One?, 19 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 703, 704 (1996). 
 393. See Forell, supra note 113, at 29 (arguing that battered women who kill their 
abusers should be given more opportunities to rely on self-defense by proving that the 
homicide was justified, rather than merely rely on the provocation defense, which only 
provides an imperfect form of justice). 
 394. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and 
Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461 (1996). 
 395. The term “the abuse excuse” was coined by Alan Dershowitz.  See generally ALAN 
M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS 
OF RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1994) (defining “abuse excuse” as “the legal tactic by which 
criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation”); see 
also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME:  VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
140 (1995) (asserting that the “abuse excuse” is used by defendants to gain sympathy 
from the decision makers). 
 396. Osby v. State, 939 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997); see also Falk, supra note 
189, at 740–41 (examining cases using the “urban survival syndrome” defense); BONNIE 
ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 492 (4th ed. 2015) (discussing attempts to establish an “urban 
survival syndrome” defense). 
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Courts have consistently rejected these claims, and scholars have 
characterized them as relying on “junk science.”397 
Conceding that some of these objections have merit and raise valid 
concerns, I argue that considering the tradeoffs between the costs of 
expanding provocation law and its overall benefits leads to the 
conclusion that the benefits outweigh the costs.  Expanding the scope 
of provocation law to recognize a fear prong would provide defendants 
with a potential basis for mitigation in a host of threatening 
circumstances, whereas under current laws, these defendants would 
likely be convicted of murder because they did not act in self-defense. 
Commentators criticize the criminal justice system’s over-punitive 
incarceration laws and policies, including the statutorily mandated 
imposition of minimum terms of imprisonment for murder 
convictions.398  One notable aspect of this critique concerns the disparate 
effects of mass incarceration and mandatory minimum sentences on 
racial minorities.399  While fully addressing this critique exceeds the 
scope of this Article, the underlying goal behind the call to recognize 
fear-based provocation is to alleviate existing problems of draconian 
sentencing structures, which mandate minimum sentences for murder 
convictions, particularly their disparate effects on racial minorities.  
Expanding provocation law by recognizing classes of fearful killers who 
might be able to persuade courts to give voluntary manslaughter jury 
instructions offers one step in this direction. 
Furthermore, the proposal includes a built-in mechanism to address 
potential concerns that fear-based provocation might appeal to 
adherents of a “law and order” agenda by contracting the scope of self-
defense doctrine.  It does this by clarifying that a court should only give 
a voluntary manslaughter instruction as a supplemental alternative 
once the main line of defense, likely self-defense, is rejected.  Put 
another way, defendants ought to rely on fear-based provocation as 
                                               
 397. See Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials:  To Junk or Not 
to Junk, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7 (1998) (comparing expert testimony regarding battered 
woman’s syndrome, which is recognized by members of the medical community, to testimony 
regarding urban survival syndrome, which is not medically recognized). 
 398. See, e.g., Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 
428 (2013) (noting that the incarceration rate in the United States is nearly seven times 
the rate in Western Europe); Forell, supra note 113, at 6–7 (noting that mandatory 
sentencing prevents restricting or eliminating provocation). 
 399. See generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism:  Racial Stratification and Mass 
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2010) (observing that 
African Americans and Latinos have higher rates of incarceration than whites). 
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expansionary and additive to self-defense and imperfect self-defense 
claims.  The proposal rejects any understandings that view fear-based 
provocation as either substitutionary to the supremacy of self-defense 
or as constraining self-defense’s scope. 
Regarding objections that reject recognition of additional forms of 
“abuse excuses” for defendants claiming prolonged physical abuse, 
fear-based provocation does not draw on any “syndromes,” whose 
purpose is to pathologize defendants in the eyes of the jury by 
suggesting that defendants’ mental disorders contributed to the 
killing.400  Recognizing fear-based provocation rests on taking into 
account the pervasive impact of fear on defendants’ judgments in a 
way that is divorced from the realm of mental disorders. 
D.   A Test Case:  Applying Fear-Based Provocation 
The elements of fear-based provocation necessitate consideration of a 
case where under current law, the defendant was convicted of murder but 
the proposed defense could have resulted in a jury instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter. 
The facts of State v. Levett401 illustrate the potential change that 
adopting fear-based provocation could make by providing defendants 
who killed out of fear with a doctrinal basis for mitigating murder to 
manslaughter in circumstances falling short of self-defense.402  In Levett, 
the deceased supplied the seventeen-year-old defendant with drugs so 
that the defendant could sell them and later give money from the sale 
to the deceased.403  On the day of the incident, the defendant, his friend, 
and his brother encountered the deceased, who demanded that the 
defendant pay him.404  A physical confrontation ensued in which the 
deceased was the initial aggressor, and hit the defendant and his brother.405  
A witness testified that after the deceased noticed that the defendant had 
a gun, he tried to take refuge in her car, but the defendant shot the 
                                               
 400. See Anne C. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1994) 
(observing the problematic implications of attempts to rely on evidence of “battered 
woman’s syndrome” to acquit female defendants on the theory of self-defense, and 
that the downside of introducing evidence of women’s abnormality is portraying them 
as mentally deviant and inferior). 
 401. No. C-040537, 2006 WL 1191851 (Ohio Ct. App. May 5, 2006). 
 402. Id. at *3. 
 403. Id. at *1. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. 
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deceased through the window.406  The defendant was indicted for murder 
and claimed that he acted in self-defense.407  He testified that he believed 
that the deceased was going to get a gun, and that he killed him out of 
fear for his life.408   
The trial court instructed the jury only on self-defense, explaining that 
“the defendant must prove that he was not at fault in creating the situation 
giving rise to the assault,” that he had an honest and reasonable grounds 
to believe that he was in imminent danger, “that his only means of retreat 
from such danger was by the use of deadly force, and he had not violated 
any duty to retreat to avoid danger.”409  The jury rejected the defendant’s 
self-defense claim and convicted him of murder.410 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by 
refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on the 
theory that he was provoked to kill out of fear that the deceased was 
about to retrieve a gun.411  The court rejected this claim, holding that 
the evidence did not support a jury instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter because, under Ohio law, such instruction is given only 
if there is evidence that the defendant acted out of sudden passion or 
a fit of rage.412  The court further held that the evidence supporting 
the claim of self-defense—that the defendant feared for his and his 
brother’s safety—did not constitute sudden passion or a fit of rage as 
contemplated by the voluntary manslaughter statute.413  While self-
defense requires a showing of fear, the court continued, “voluntary 
manslaughter requires a showing of rage, with emotions of ‘anger, 
hatred, jealousy, and/or furious resentment.’”414  To receive a jury 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the defendant should have 
introduced evidence that he was provoked to kill in a state of sudden 
passion or fit of rage, which he failed to do.415  Since the defendant 
claimed that he feared that the deceased was about to shoot him, the 
                                               
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. at *2. 
 408. See id. (explaining that the defendant testified that “[I] [t]hought he was going 
to take my life, that’s what I was thinking:  either me or him” (alteration in original)). 
 409. Id. at *3. 
 410. Id. at *1. 
 411. Id. at *4. 
 412. See id. (finding that “[f]ear alone is insufficient to demonstrate the kind of 
emotional state necessary to constitute sudden passion or fit of rage” (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Mack, 694 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (Ohio 1998)). 
 413. Id. at *4–5. 
 414. Id. at *4 (quoting State v. Perdue, 792 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)). 
 415. Id. at *4–5. 
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court concluded that this evidence did not suffice to establish 
provocation.416  Levett’s murder conviction was therefore affirmed, and he 
was sentenced to eighteen years to life in prison.417 
Levett poignantly exemplifies the way courts often view self-defense and 
provocation as mutually exclusive rather than supplemental doctrines.  As 
one Ohio court stated:  “[A]n instruction on voluntary manslaughter and 
self-defense is erroneous because the two legal theories are 
incompatible . . . . Voluntary manslaughter requires that the defendant be 
under the influence of sudden passion or a fit of rage, while  
self-defense requires the defendant to be in fear of his own person safety.”418 
As a thought experiment, let us hypothesize what might have happened 
had the proposed fear-based provocation provision applied and a jury 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter had been given in Levett.  First, the 
defendant could have requested that the court instruct the jury on both 
self-defense and fear-based provocation as supplemental defenses.  The 
defendant’s first line of defense would remain self-defense, as accepting 
it would lead to acquittal of any homicide offense.  However, if the jury 
rejected the self-defense claim, it would still be able to consider reducing 
the murder to voluntary manslaughter, based on the theory that 
defendant feared that the deceased was going to shoot him, and that this 
fear impaired his rational judgment. 
In Levett, the evidence clearly established that the defendant’s 
shooting fell short of self-defense since the deceased presented no 
imminent threat of shooting the defendant when he ran away, trying 
to shield himself inside the female witness’s car.419  The circumstances 
surrounding the incident, however, including witnesses’ testimonies, 
indicate that the deceased not only initiated the aggression towards 
defendant and his brother but also stated that he was going to retrieve 
his gun.420  Given this evidence, it is likely that Levett genuinely feared 
that the deceased was about to shoot him, and that this intense fear, 
stemming from the deceased’s threatening behavior, overwhelmed 
him and distorted his judgment.  It is likely, therefore that Levett could 
have established the subjective component of fear-based provocation. 
The main hurdle that Levett would have faced had fear-based 
provocation been adopted would be proving the objective prong of the 
                                               
 416. Id. at *5. 
 417. Id. at *1. 
 418. State v. Jefferson, 971 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012). 
 419. Levett, 2006 WL 1191851, at *1. 
 420. Id. 
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defense, namely, that a defendant with an ordinary temperament, 
tolerance and self-restraint, might have experienced similar fear that 
significantly impaired his judgment, causing him to act rashly without 
deliberation.  Establishing this element hinges on introducing sufficient 
evidence that an ordinary seventeen-year-old youth, standing in the 
defendant’s shoes and facing similar surrounding circumstances, would 
have similarly experienced significant impairment in judgment due to 
fear for his life that would have led him to respond aggressively—even if 
not necessarily to kill. 
Importantly, instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter will not 
necessarily result in the jury’s acceptance of the defense’s fear-based 
provocation theory.  Establishing the elements of this defense is 
contingent on factual determinations that would be left for the jury to 
decide.  It is plausible that even if the jury in Levett had been instructed 
on voluntary manslaughter, they would have rejected the option of 
mitigating murder to manslaughter, and conclude that the killing was 
unprovoked by either anger or fear.  Granted, the jury could have 
reasonably concluded, based on the evidence, that Levett was motivated 
by desire for revenge, and therefore should not enjoy any mitigation.  
However, a rational jury could have also reasonably concluded that Levett 
killed out of deep fear for his life, therefore warranting partially excusing 
his act by reducing the offense to voluntary manslaughter.  Providing the 
jury with additional basis for mitigation would not have necessarily 
resulted in automatically reducing Levett’s murder charges.  Instead, 
fear-based provocation would have merely expanded the options that 
the jury might have considered, leaving them to decide whether 
mitigation was warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
Recently, there has been an emergence of a growing body of 
psychological research on the effects of emotions on individuals’ 
thought processes, judgment, and reasoning.421  The law is increasingly 
following through, as it evolves to recognize the pervasive effect that 
intense emotions, including anger and fear, have on shaping criminal 
behavior.422  This Article is yet another piece in this puzzle, as it calls 
                                               
 421. See supra Part III (discussing the psychological research on fear). 
 422. For scholarship on the relationship between law and the emotions, see 
generally Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. 
L. REV. 1997 (2010); Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion:  A Proposed Taxonomy of an 
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on legislatures and courts to consider the insights that might be gained 
from psychological research on the way fear operates. 
This Article has largely focused on the effects of fear on defendants 
who killed those who placed them at risk of violence. Yet, another area 
in which individuals’ emotions impact their decision making, albeit in 
a more implicit and nuanced way, concerns juries’ choices about 
whether a defendant is entitled to certain defenses such as self-defense 
and provocation. Considering provocation’s stakeholders suggests that 
some defendants who raise the defense are likely to be perceived by 
juries as sympathetic, thus warranting compassion and mercy, while 
others are likely to be viewed as unsympathetic and morally blameworthy 
killers, thus leading juries to reject their claim for mitigation. 
This Article invites questioning into whether decision makers’ 
sympathy ought to shape the scope of the provocation doctrine.  
People who suffer from intimate partner battering and battered 
children are mostly sympathetic defendants.  They are often women 
who fit stereotypical perceptions about femininity, including weakness, 
helplessness, and passivity.  Given the sordid nature of some of these 
domestic abuse cases, abused defendants are often perceived as 
deserving compassion and mercy.  Yet, in closer cases, involving less 
agreeable defendants who raise diffuse claims of fear and prior abuse, 
prosecutorial discretion might sway towards a more heavy-handed 
punitive approach.  After all, drug dealers, violent gang members, or 
drunken participants in bar brawls, all armed with guns, and not shying 
away from aggression, are hardly the type of defendants that 
prosecutors or juries are likely to sympathize with and afford 
leniency.423  Arguably, many readers would balk at the idea of further 
enlargement of a defense that is already perceived as inherently 
problematic.  Critics might wonder why mitigating the charges against 
violent, dangerous and mostly male killers, is normatively warranted. 
But should emotions like sympathy and compassion shape the scope of 
criminal responsibility?  This Article concludes that from a normative 
perspective, decision makers’ sympathy and compassion towards certain 
defendants should not matter for the purpose of determining whether 
defendants who killed out of fear of violence ought to receive a jury 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Mitigating charges to a lesser 
                                               
Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006); THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes 
ed., 1999). 
 423. See Gruber, supra note 85, at 185–87 (discussing non-intimate defendants’ claims 
for provocation). 
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offense is warranted not because a defendant appears worthy of mercy 
but because the law ought to recognize that fear undermines rational 
judgment.  The fact that defendants’ abilities to rationally assess threats 
is significantly impaired when facing deep fear pertains directly to the 
scope of criminal liability and moral blameworthiness rather than to 
the sentencing phase.  Recognizing fear-based provocation provides a 
mechanism for diminishing the effect of juries’ emotions on their 
decision on whether a defendant should prevail on the provocation 
defense.  It therefore provides a principled and coherent basis for 
mitigating murder to manslaughter that is consistent with a sliding 
scale approach towards defendants’ moral culpability. 
